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SOLID WASTE FLOW CONTROL:
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND BEYOND
John H. Turner*
In C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, NY,' the United States Supreme
Court utilized the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution2 to invali-
date a municipal "flow control" ordinance that required solid waste haulers to
deliver collected wastes to a designated facility.' Since the Carbone decision
was handed down, local governments have attempted, in several instances, to cir-
cumvent the Court's ruling by utilizing so-called "franchises" or by requiring
solid waste haulers to sign contracts obligating them to dispose of collected
wastes at designated facilities, rather than denying necessary licenses or permits
to operate. Similarly, some jurisdictions have mandated that waste haulers abide
by "economic flow control" programs on the basis that the "back door flow con-
trol" regimes are beyond the scope of the Carbone holding.
Yet another effort to avoid the clear implications of the Court's decision
involves so-called "bifurcated" or "as enforced bifurcated" ordinances, which
essentially require waste haulers not utilizing out-of-state disposal facilities to
deliver materials to a designated local site. A handful of jurisdictions, primarily
in Minnesota and Ohio, have either formally amended flow control ordinances or
have announced that they will take no enforcement action with regard to wastes
that are transported across a state line Such actions are intended to preclude the
intrastate movement of waste and seek to ensure that the majority of wastes gen-
erated within the area remain there. "Intrastate" flow control requirements pre-
vent the efficient and environmentally protective disposal of solid waste, howev-
er, and are contrary to both the spirit of the Supreme Court's decision in Carbone
and the Commerce Clause itself.
This Article briefly discusses why the above-described efforts to avoid the
reach of Carbone also transgress the Commerce Clause. But, the primary focus
is upon non-Commerce Clause federal constitutional grounds for challenges to
flow control ordinances and programs, most notably the Equal Protection Clause.
The preemption doctrine is also briefly discussed, particularly with regard to
local solid waste management regulations and laws that may be intended to result
in or effectuate a form of"de facto" flow control.
*Divisional Vice-President, State Government Affairs, Browning-Ferris Industries; J.D., Vanderbilt University
(1981); B.S., University of Alabama (1978). The opinions expressed in this Article are those of the author.
1. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
2. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. John Turner, The Flow Control of Solid Waste and the Commerce Clause: Carbone and Its Progeny, 7
VILL. ENVT'L L.J. 203 (1996) (http:VLS.LAW.VILL.EDU/students/orgs/elj/volO7/tumrtbl.htm).
4. For example, Hennepin County, Minnesota reacted to the Carbone decision by stating that it would
temporarily suspend enforcement of its flow control ordinance with regard to wastes that are transported to out-
of-state facilities.
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I. THE PROPER REACH OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE:
ENSURING THE VIABILITY OF THE CARBONE RULING
Courts have invalidated numerous flow control ordinances and regulations
since Carbone.' In one of the more recent decisions, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals enjoined enforcement of New Jersey's flow control regulations, empha-
sizing that "the State of New Jersey cannot protect the local waste disposal mar-
ket, and thereby exclude out-of-state competitors, in order to use inflated rev-
enues to finance the substantial debts of its waste management districts."6 The
Sixth Circuit likewise invalidated Nashville, Tennessee's flow control system.7
Because invalidation is virtually certain8 for a flow control regulation or statute
restricting the issuance of licenses or permits to specified facilities, some local
governments have contemplated turning to franchises, or so-called "economic
flow control" programs, or "intrastate" requirements in order to avoid the impli-
cations of the Carbone ruling. As this section demonstrates, such efforts should
not escape the reach of the Commerce Clause.
A. Municipal Franchises & Contracts!"Economic Flow Control"
Whether by "as enforced" or truly "bifurcated" flow control ordinances, sever-
al local governments have sought to undermine the Carbone holding through
new or modified flow control requirements that prohibit the delivery of waste to
alternative in-state facilities. For example, some local governments have imple-
mented de facto flow control schemes, such as "market participant" franchise
requirements, which are essentially regulatory licensing programs or "economic
flow control" programs that create no "legal" obligation to use a preferred facili-
ty, but impose an economic disincentive to go elsewhere. Other local govern-
ments have relied upon "intrastate" flow control mandates to achieve the same
result.
In Ben Oehrleins & Sons & Daughter, Inc. v. Hennepin County, Minnesota,9
the Eighth Circuit, while paying particular attention to an unrelated standing
issue, concluded that the Hennepin County ordinance, while not immune from
5. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 3, at 220-2 1.
6. Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Atlantic County
(Atlantic Coast II), 112 F.3d 652 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, Nos. 97-400, 97-430 (Nov. 10, 1997).
7. Waste Management of Tenn. v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville and Davidson County, 1997 FED App.
03330P (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 1997).
8. The New Jersey and Nashville experiences amply demonstrate the point. New Jersey's primary
defense was that its process of regulating waste collection and disposal rates justified a more lenient standard of
Commerce Clause review, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's declaration in Arkansas Electric Cooperative
Corp. v. Arkansas Public Service Commission, 461 U.S. 375, 391 (1983) that "[o]ur constitutional review of
state utility regulation in related contexts has not treated it as a special province insulated from our general
Commerce Clause jurisprudence." See also Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454-59 (1992); New
England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338-39 (1982). Nashville's unsuccessful defense centered
around the argument that the Commerce Clause could not be violated unless all regulated solid waste was sub-
ject to a flow control mandate (residential waste was flow controlled; certain non-residential wastes were not)
- a position contrary to the Court's prior rulings. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. at 437; Maine v.
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); Foster-Fountain Packaging Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
9. 115 E3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 66 USLW 3298 (No. 97-605) and 66 USLW 3335 (No. 97-
787) (Dec. 15, 1997).
[VOL. 19:53
SOLID WASTE FLOW CONTROL
the Commerce Clause, should be subject to the traditionally less-intrusive test set
forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.'" The Supreme Court recently denied certio-
rari in Oehrleins, neglecting the opportunity to forcefully pronounce that it meant
what it said in Carbone: flow control measures violate the Commerce Clause.
Similarly, several jurisdictions outside of the Second Circuit have improperly
contended that the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari1' in SSC Corp. v. Town of
Smithtown 2 and USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon 3 immunizes from
Commerce Clause scrutiny franchise ordinances whose waste delivery provisions
are essentially nonnegotiable. The result is a process virtually identical to the
flow control mandates created by the type of ordinance examined in Carbone.4
Unlike some franchise arrangements, in which the award is either for collection
only, in which case the hauler may choose the collection site, or combined col-
lection/disposal franchises, in which the hauler and community may negotiate
which disposal site(s) is utilized, these programs give the franchisee "no choice"
-it must utilize a particular facility as a condition of the franchise.
Some local governments, by invoking the so-called "market participant"
exception to the dormant Commerce Clause,"5 have sought to control the fran-
chise program by requiring that a waste hauler indicate in the franchise applica-
tion its "plan for disposal" or otherwise state that it will utilize a preferred dis-
posal facility. Similarly, municipal contracts for collection or recycling have
included flow control provisions in instances in which no reasonable opportunity
for negotiation exists, such that the hauler has no alternative but to reject outright
the contract and be deprived of the "privilege" of servicing the community. In
such cases, the Commerce Clause has been violated."
10. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
11. A denial of certiorari has no precedential value. See, e.g., Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines,
409 U.S. 363, 366 n.1 (1973); United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923). See also Maryland v.
Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950).
12. 66 E3d 502 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 911 (1996). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
while finding that a flow control ordinance violated the Constitution, upheld a "generic" mandatory garbage
hauling contract modeled after the ordinance pursuant to the "market participant" doctrine. The doctrine acts as
a court-created exception to the Commerce Clause. It basically provides that if a state or locality is simply act-
ing as an economic participant in a free marketplace - no more and no less - the Commerce Clause is not
violated because the government is not engaging in any activity that a private party could not fully perform.
13. 66 F3d 1272 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1419 (1996).
14. The municipal actions at issue in Smithtown and Babylon are discussed in Turner, supra note 3, at 236-56.
15. See generally Bruce H. Aber, Note, State Regulation of Out-of-State Garbage Subject to Dormant
Commerce Clause Review and the Market Participant Exception, 1 FORDHAM ENVT'L. L.J. 99, 105-08 (1989).
16. The "market participant" doctrine has been criticized by a number of courts and commentators. See,
e.g., Turner, supra note 3, at 215-219, 245-256. See generally Big County Foods, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 952
F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1992); New Orleans S.S. Assoc. v. Plaquemines Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist., 874 F.2d
1018 (5th Cir. 1989); Shell Oil Co. v. City of Santa Monica, 830 F.2d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 1987); E&E
Hauling, Inc., v. Forest Preserve Dist. of DuPage County, Ill., 821 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1987); Cory v. Western Oil
& Gas Ass'n, 726 E2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1984), aff'dper curiam by an equally divided court, 471 U.S. 81 (1985);
W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1984); J. L. Smith v. Department of Agric. of Ga., 630
F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1980).
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The Second Circuit's decisions in Smithtown and Babylon17 have not been well
received by courts in other jurisdictions---or within the Second Circuit itself-
for good reason. In both cases, the towns actually operated as market regulators,
rather than as mere participants. Smithtown, for example, implemented its pro-
gram through a permit process, under which private waste haulers could not
operate within the City in the absence of a permit. The program also provided
for the creation of solid waste collection districts and the award of exclusive col-
lection rights within those districts, the imposition of civil and criminal penalties
for noncompliance, and a refusal to accept municipal bids from any party that
refused to agree to abide by the City's requirements. No private party could,
without the risk of legal liability, have engaged in such behavior. Private parties
cannot enact laws and promulgate regulations. They cannot prohibit competitors
from operating within particular marketplaces. They cannot create their own
enforcement mechanisms to subject competitors to criminal and civil fines. They
act for commercial reasons, not for public policy reasons. The Second Circuit's
approach renders the market participant/regulator distinction unworkable. 9
There are numerous other deficiencies in the reasoning of the Second Circuit.2"
The market participant doctrine is properly limited to instances in which a state
17. The Second Circuit affirmed its decisions in Smithtown and Babylon in Sal Tinnerello & Sons, Inc. v.
Stonington, 141 E3d 46 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, No. 98-69 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1998). Stonington, Connecticut
developed a franchise system that was explicitly modeled on the ordinance and contract utilized by Babylon
and the contract developed by Smithtown. The court also affirmed the dismissal of a claim that the defendant's
determination that it would adversely affect the ability of the plaintiff to service its customers under contract
through the exclusive franchising of collection services with another waste hauler - for the purpose of assur-
ing flow control to a designated facility - violated the Contract Clause. But see Turner, supra note 3, at 253-
54. See also Automated Salvage Transp., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Envtl. Sys., No. 96-9281 (2d Cir. Aug. 20,
1998), 1998 U.S. App. Lexis 22030 (rejecting antitrust claims regarding agreement between competitors).
18. But see Bennett Elec. Co. v. Village of Miami Shores, 1998 WL 310651 (S.D. Fla. May 6, 1998) (find-
ing that a municipal takeover of garbage collection to the exclusion of private haulers was within the market
participant doctrine and referring extensively to Babylon); Waste Management of Alameda County, Inc. v.
Biagini Waste Reduction Sys., Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 676 (Cal. App. 1998) (holding that an exclusive agreement
with company for collection and disposal is not a Commerce Clause violation); Houlton Citizens' Coalition v.
Town of Houlton, 982 E Supp. 40 (D. Me. 1997) (relying upon Smithtown, Babylon, and Tinnerello); Huish
Detergents, Inc. v. Warren Co., Ky., No. l:97-CV-123-M (WD. Ky. March 31, 1998). In National Solid Waste
Management Ass'n v. Williams, No. 97-2987 (8th Cir. June 12, 1998), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld a Minnesota statute that requires local governments to conduct solid waste management programs in
accordance with comprehensive county solid waste plans. Several of the county plans contain "designation,"
i.e., flow control, recommendations. The state does not provide funding for the implementation of the county
plans. Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit, disagreeing with the conclusion of the Seventh Circuit in WC.M.
Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 E2d 486, 495 (7th Cir. 1984) (the market participant doctrine cannot apply when a
state imposes requirements on local governments without any state financial support or supervision), agreed
with the Third Circuit's earlier ruling in Trojan Tech., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 E2d 903, 911 (3d Cir. 1990) that
there is "no compelling analytical difference between a local government unit and central state agencies." The
court specifically declined to rule "on the propriety of a governmental entity assuming public control of all
waste disposal within its borders in order to resurrect a previously unconstitutional flow control ordinance."
See also Houlton Citizen's Coalition v. Town of Houlton, Civ. No. 97-216-B (D. Me. June 29, 1998), 1998 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 9704; Huish Detergents, Inc. v. Warren County, Kentucky, C.A. No. l:97-CV-123-M (WD. Ky.
March 31, 1998).
19. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 592-94 (1997); New
Energy Co. of Indiana v. LimbachTax Comm'r of Ohio, 486 U.S. 269, 277 (1988).
20. One curious aspect of Babylon involved the Town's taxing scheme, which imposed fees that were
directly proportional to the waste tonnages generated by commercial entities. Thus, the Town was not impos-
ing, as the Supreme Court recommended in Carbone, "general taxes or municipal bonds," 511 U.S. at 394, for
the subsidization of a facility; instead, in a manner inconsistent with Carbone, it was imposing a non-general
tax based purely on actually generated waste volumes. This aspect of the Babylon decision further reduces the
likelihood that courts outside the Second Circuit would follow its reasoning.
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participates in a marketplace (without seeking to control it) as a buyer and seller
of goods or as a direct employer, not simply as a beneficiary of services that are
performed by independent parties (here, waste haulers)." The activities of the
towns had an impact on "down-stream" markets in contravention of the Supreme
Court's ruling in South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke.22 The
obvious "fiction" created by application of the market participant doctrine is cre-
ated, in part, by the fact that local governments invoke the doctrine to defend flow
control mandates while, at the same time, asserting that solid waste collection is a
traditional governmental function that implicates police power concerns-an
inherently regulatory activity.23 More pragmatically, the type of sweeping reorga-
nization of solid waste collection engaged in by Smithtown and Babylon presents
a variety of state law,24 political, 2s and economic 2 consequences. Moreover, at
21. See Hughes v. Alexander Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980);
White, Mayor of Boston v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1984).
22. 467 U.S. 82 (1983). See Stanley E. Cox, Garbage In, Garbage Out: Court Confusion About the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 50 OKLA. L. REv. 155 (1997); Randall S. Abate & Mark E. Bennett, Constitutional
Limitations on Anticompetitive State and Local Solid Waste Management Schemes: A New Frontier in
Environmental Regulation, 14 YALE J. REG. 165, 191-92 (1997) (The Smithtown
court's conclusion that the town acted as market participant (whose actions are not subject to the
Commerce Clause limitations) in contracting for waste disposal services in fulfillment of the objec-
tives of the flow control ordinance is inconsistent with its ruling on the flow control ordinance and
sets a bad precedent. The court's holding regarding the waste hauling contracts at issue in SSC
allows the town to "have it both ways" by simultaneously escaping Carbone Commerce Clause
scrutiny and enjoying antitrust immunity. In essence, what the court precluded the town from pursu-
ing on a broad scale in the form of the flow control ordinance, it enabled the town to undertake on a
cumulative, piecemeal basis in the form of the waste hauling contracts. The SSC decision could
send a dangerous message to municipalities in the solid waste management field by encouraging
them to enter into waste hauling contracts with private contractors as market participants to achieve
anticompetitive results. This would allow them to make an "end run" around what they otherwise
would be prohibited from achieving as market regulators.);
Note, SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown and USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon: Reinvigoration of the
Market Participant Exception in the Arena of Municipal Solid Waste Management, 49 VAND. L. REv. 753, 782-
83 (1996) (casting doubt on the wisdom of the decisions in light of antitrust immunity; noting that while "[t]he
market participant exception rests on the notion that when a government acts as a market participant, it should
be able to function in the same capacity as a private entity," the existence of antitrust immunity means that,
[i]n light of their inherent sovereign nature coupled with their access to a wealth of resources, gov-
ernments may actually gain an advantage over private entities when shielded by the market partici-
pant exception. A more prudent approach, therefore, may be to scrutinize the custom of the private
industry and ensure that the market participant exception does not provide the government with an
unfair advantage over that industry. Such scrutiny would ensure that a government enjoys protection
under the market participant exception only when it truly acts in the same capacity as a private enti-
ty.).
23. To the extent the doctrine possesses any logic, it suggests that a public entity may, to the same extent as
a private concern, determine that it will utilize its disposal capacity for its own wastes. See Turner, supra note
3, at 217 n.62. See, e.g., Red River Serv. Corp. v. City of Minot, N.D., 1998 WL 300525 (8th Cir. June 10,
1998) (holding that a city may determine that it does not wish to accept waste generated by a local Air Force
base at its own landfill, as long as the determination does not affect private parties in their ability to transport
waste to locations willing to accept the material).
24. See, e.g., Eads St. Corp. v. Town of Babylon, 631 N.Y.S.2d 878 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Turner, supra
note 3, at 239.
25. See Bob Brown, NJ Haulers Sue Official, WASTE NEWS, Sept. 29, 1997, at 2; Steve Daniels, Haulers
Sue N Y Town, WASTE NEWS, Sept. 1, 1997, at 3:
(Officials in the Long Island, N.Y. town of Babylon allegedly conspired to hand a politically con-
nected group of haulers a lucrative commercial carting contract and then illegally sweetened the deal
just before it took effect, two carting companies and three commercial generators charged in a law-
suit .... [T]he U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York state, as well as the Suffolk
County, N.Y. district attorney's office reportedly are investigating at least some of the allegations.).
26. For example, the movement to an exclusive franchise system from "open subscription" means fewer
choices for generators and can have the effect of putting smaller waste haulers out of business.
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least in Smithtown's case, the desired return of waste flows to the chosen facility
did not occur.
27
The Third Circuit, rejecting application of the market participant doctrine,
held, in Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester,28 that the Commerce Clause
is applicable and that a different standard-an elaborate examination of the total-
ity of the evidence, including evidence of protectionist intent or motivation-
applies when the flow control mandate or program results from franchising or
competitive contracting for the disposal (rather than the collection, or the collec-
tion and disposal) of solid waste.29 The Third Circuit's insistence upon a search-
ing review of the motivations of the public entity and the components of the bid-
ding and award processes is a significant departure from the type of axiomatic
Commerce Clause immunity granted by the Second Circuit.
A good example of the proper reach of the Commerce Clause in these cases is
found in Tracy v. Hebron.3 0 There, the defendant entered into a contract with a
landfill that obligated the City to deliver regulated wastes to the facility. The
plaintiff, a waste hauler, had a contract with a competing landfill and refused to
comply with the terms of the City's contract. In retaliation, the City stated that it
would renew the hauler's waste collection license (a mandatory requirement for
collection of waste within the City), but only upon the condition that the hauler
deliver waste to the designated facility. When the City discovered that the hauler
was continuing to use the other landfill, it passed a resolution revoking his
license. Eventually, the City selected another company as its exclusive fran-
chisee. The court found that the Commerce Clause had been violated. 1
In Condon v. Andino, Inc., a federal district court invalidated a franchise ordi-
nance that required waste haulers to deliver materials to a particular facility. 2
The court reasoned that the market participant doctrine did not save the ordi-
nance from the Commerce Clause or invalidation because a private party could
not legally prevent competitors, with whom it did not enter into contractual
arrangements, from operating within a particular area. Similarly, in Heir's
Trucking, Inc. v. Waupaca County, the court struck down a flow control require-
27. See Mary Greczyn, NY Town Fixes Its Flow, WASTE NEWS, Nov. 3, 1997, at 3.
28. 68 E3d 788 (3d Cir. 1995). See Turner, supra note 3, at 230-35.
29. For an example of how the Harvey & Harvey test can be applied, see Barker Bros. Waste, Inc. v. Dyer
County Legislative Body, 923 F. Supp. 1042 (W.D. Tenn. 1996).
30. No. 4:CV95-3218 (D. Neb. May 2, 1996). See also Condon v. Andino, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 323 (D. Me.
1997) (discussing flow control requirements included in waste collection franchise/contract invalid); Heier's
Trucking, Inc. v. Waupaca County, 569 N.W2d 352 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
31. The appropriately narrow reach of the "market participant" exception was noted in Atlantic Coast
Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders (Atlantic Coast 1), 48 F.3d 701 (3d Cir.1995),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 412 (1997), in which the court emphasized that
[w]hen a public entity participates in a market, it may sell and buy what it chooses, to or from whom
it chooses, on terms of its choice; its market participation does not, however, confer upon it the right
to use its regulatory power to control the actions of others in that market.
Id. at 717. See also Container Corp. of Carolina v. Mecklenburg Co., 1995 WL 360185 (WD.N.C. June 22,
1995); Southcentral Pa. Waste Haulers Ass'n v. Bedford-Fulton-Huntingdon Solid Waste Auth., No. I:CV-93-
1318 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 1995).
32. 961 E Supp. 323 (D. Me. 1997). See generally Barton B. Clark, Comment, Give 'Em Enough Rope:
States, Subdivisions the Market Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 60 U. CHi. L. REv.
615, 627 (1993).
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ment, rejecting the market participant defense on the ground that "[t]his is not a
power that a private party selling processing services could use to require per-
sons to do business with it."
33
"Economic flow control" programs involve local governments seeking to
achieve the same result in a particular marketplace as the ordinance invalidated
in Carbone by reducing the "tip fee" (disposal charge) at the "preferred" facility,
while making up the difference through some form of mandatory fee imposed
upon waste haulers or generators. While such measures are often predicated
upon a protectionist motivation, they do not, on their face, require waste haulers
to deliver collected materials to a preferred facility. Instead, they create signifi-
cant economic disincentives for the use of an alternative facility. As several
courts have recognized, economic flow control typically is simply ordinance flow
control by another name. Both methods result in interference with protected
commerce. Recent decisions in the lower courts have either strongly suggested
or expressly held that certain "economic flow control" programs are unconstitu-
tional. 4
The Mid-American Waste Systems,35 Connecticut Carting,36 and Kandiyohi
County 7 decisions are instructive in that they deal with situations in which local
governments unsuccessfully attempted to avoid the reach of Carbone by reallo-
cating disposal tip fees in such a way as to provide a form of economic flow con-
trol. Kandiyohi County, Minnesota sought to retain flow control authority after
the Carbone decision was issued by reducing the tip fee at the preferred facility
from $50.60 per ton to $25 per ton. 6 The differential was made up by the institu-
tion of a $26.50 per ton generator fee, payable regardless of the site at which the
waste was delivered.39 The program created a strong economic motivation to use
the formerly "designated" facility-and an economic sanction upon haulers (and
their customers) that chose to deliver waste elsewhere.4" The Minnesota Court
of Appeals, finding that the "combination of the service fee and the tipping fee
would be discriminatory in its effect," determined that the economic flow control
effort was unconstitutional.
The court agreed with the district court's position that
[o]nce the garbage has been collected by the hauler, the lower tip fee at the
County landfill, made possible by a subsidy from the service fee, renders other
landfills uncompetitive, essentially forcing all haulers to either utilize the ser-
33. 569 N.W2d 355 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
34. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994); Connecticut Carting Co. v. Town of
East Lyme, 946 F. Supp. 152 (D. Conn. 1995); Mid-American Waste Sys., Inc. v. Fisher, No. C-2-94-493, slip
op. (S.D. Ohio May 31, 1994); Sanifill, Inc. v. Kandiyohi County, Minn., 559 N.W2d 111 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997). But see Zenith/Kremer Waste Systems, Inc. v. Western Lake Superior Sanitary Dist., 558 N.W2d 288
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997), rev d, 572 N.W2d 300 (Minn. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1857 (1998).
35. Mid-American Waste Sys., Inc., No. C-2-94-493, slip op.
36. Connecticut Carting Co., 946 E Supp. at 152.
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vices of the County landfill or incur higher total costs due to transportation
expenses and/or higher tip fees at other facilities.42
Accordingly,
[b]ecause of the subsidy, users of other landfills would be forced to pay not only
the tipping fees at the disposal facility they use, but also for county landfill
operations to the extent that the service fee subsidizes the county landfill, while
those who use the county landfill would enjoy an artificially low tipping fee.
Moreover, other disposal facilities would be less able to compete with the coun-
ty landfill if it is able to charge an artificially low tipping fee because of the ser-
vice fee subsidy."3
The Solid Waste Authority of Ohio (hereinafter "SWACO"), which, by resolu-
tion, established a "generation fee on all in-district generated solid wastes of
forty-nine dollars per ton, with disposal rates at SWACO's facilities of $0.00 per
ton, and tipping fees at SWACO's three in-district solid waste transfer stations of
$0.00, $0.00, and five dollars per ton,""" was criticized by a federal district court
for obviously attempting to avoid the direct holding of Carbone by ensuring flow
control without directly ordering waste haulers to use a particular disposal facili-
ty. The court issued a preliminary injunction against the program, and the parties
subsequently reached an out-of-court settlement.45
East Lyme, Connecticut imposed a mandatory per-ton fee assessed against
waste haulers in order to support a put-or-pay agreement between the town and a
waste-to-energy facility."1 The town simply converted the prior disposal charge
to a tonnage fee that was calculated on the basis of the amount of waste collected
by the hauler, regardless of where the waste was disposed. '7 A federal district
court ruled that the program was unconstitutional. 8
However, in Zenith/Kremer Waste Systems, Inc. v. Western Lake Superior
Sanitary District, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the Commerce Clause
was not violated by an economic flow control program created by the Western
Lake Sanitary District (Duluth, Minnesota). 9 The District had imposed a flow
control mandate prior to Carbone which contained a tip fee of $63 per ton at the
designated landfill." After the Supreme Court's ruling and a district court order
invalidating the District's flow control ordinance,5 ' a waste hauler announced
that it intended to deliver its volumes to an alternative facility.52 The District re-
42. Id. at 115.
43. Id.
44. Memorandum Opinion, at 3.
45. Mid-American Waste Sys., Inc., No. C-2-94-493, slip op.
46. Connecticut Carting Co., 946 F. Supp at 152.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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sponded by lowering the tip fee at its facility to $39.75 and by imposing a "man-
agement" (i.e., generator) fee of $28 per ton, again, payable regardless of where
the hauler disposed of the waste. 3 A portion of the management fee, $7 per ton,
was dedicated to the financing of debt service and covering the operating costs
of the District's facility. A Minnesota appeals court held that the program violat-
ed the Commerce Clause. The state supreme court, looking separately at the tip
charge and the management fee, concluded that neither explicitly discriminated
against protected commerce. It noted that the fee imposed "only a minor, inci-
dental burden on interstate commerce which is far outweighed by the benefits to
the municipality." 4
However, the Minnesota Court of Appeals properly recognized that, with
regard to the management fee,
[a]t least seven dollars of this management fee covers debt service on improve-
ments to the Facility, thus permitting [the District] to reduce its tipping fee to
below the amount necessary without the $7 subsidy from the management fee.
Haulers to out-of-state landfills pay the entire management fee, but do not
receive the 'rebate' that haulers to the Facility receive through the Facility's
reduced tipping fee. In effect, then, at least seven dollars of the waste manage-
ment fee, or a seven dollar tax, is imposed only on haulers to out-of-state land-
fills, and the ability of those haulers to lower their prices to compete with the
Facility is impaired accordingly,... Here, [the District] benefits at the expense
of out-of-state interests to the extent that [it] wins business from out-of-state
facilities that cannot compete with [the] subsidized tipping fee. 5
In addressing economic flow control programs, it is important that courts
avoid the myopic approach utilized by the Minnesota Supreme Court. Both the
effect and the obviously protectionist purpose of the combined generator fee and
reduced disposal charge was to create a waste flow control system in which
waste haulers had a distinct economic incentive to utilize the District's facility-
indeed, they were financially penalized for not doing so. Those who wished to
utilize other disposal options were penalized because their customers were forced
to pay the franchise fee, in addition to the transportation costs and the tip fee
imposed by the receiving facility. The economic incentive to utilize a competing
in-state or out-of-state facility was, accordingly, seriously diminished, and waste
53. Id.
54. 572 N.W.2d 300, 304 (Minn. 1997).
55. 558 N.W2d 288, 291 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). For a discussion of several economic arguments against
"economic flow control," see Note, Without a Clue and Still Without a Master Plan: Municipalities Left
Uncertain How to Manage Waste Disposal Crisis in Wake of Third Circuit Decision in Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v.
County of Chester, 9 VILL. ENvT'L. L.J. 225 (1998).
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was thereby "directed" to the preferred facility."8 The adverse effect of the sys-
tem could readily be demonstrated by an examination of the disposal market-
place. The purpose or intent of the fee was also clear-to attempt to avoid the
reach of the Carbone decision and the district court ruling regarding flow control
imposed through a hauler-licensing ordinance through a purportedly "voluntary"
56. Some writers have suggested that the Supreme Court's decision in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,
Commissioner of Massachusetts Department of Food and Agriculture, 512 U.S. 186 (1994), sweeps broadly
over state and local "subsidies," tax incentives, and locational preferences. See, e.g., Peter D. Enrich, Saving the
States From Themselves: Commerce Clause Restraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARv. L. REv.
378 (1996); Christopher P. LaPuma, Note, Massachusetts Tax and Subsidy Scheme iolates Commerce Clause:
West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 48 TAX LAw 641, 653 (1995) (The opinion "cast[s] doubt on the validity of
subsidies themselves." These commentators, and others, suggest that a wide variety of state and local subsidy
and incentive programs are inconsistent with the Commerce Clause.). See also William L. Oemichen, Milk
State Taxes, State Subsidies, and the Commerce Clause: When States Cannot Tax an Agricultural Commodity to
Fund a Subsidy for its Struggling Industries, West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994), 18
HAMLINE L. RE. 415, 428-29 (1995) (the "decision places in constitutional jeopardy the ability of states to sub-
sidize domestic industries").
While the precise parameters of West Lynn Creamery have not been delineated, it is clear that the scheme
employed in Zenith/Kremer circumvented the notion that a tax and subsidy may not be combined to create what
is essentially a "protective tariff."
By granting a tax exemption for local products, Hawaii [in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, Dir. of
Taxation of Haw., 468 U.S. 263 (1984)] in effect created a protective tariff.... And if a discrimina-
tory tax rebate is unconstitutional, Massachusetts' pricing order is surely invalid, for Massachusetts
not only rebates to domestic milk producers the tax paid on the sale of Massachusetts milk, but also
the tax paid on the sale of milk produced elsewhere.
West Lynn Creamery, Inc., 512 U.S. at 197. That is precisely the economic effect of the combined fee/subsidy
implemented by the Western Lake District. Moreover, as the plaintiffnoted, the defendant simply did not create
a subsidy exclusively funded from general tax revenues. Certainly, even a "pure subsidy funded out of general
revenues" is permissible only to the extent that "local businesses ... are not competing with businesses out of
State." Id. at 208 (Scalia, J., concurring). The District specifically dedicated at least a portion of the revenues
for a particular purpose: the local disposal facility. It did not possess the power to impose a tax or charge for
general revenue purposes. It could only assess a fee or tax for the purpose of funding its operations for servic-
ing its own debt.
Moreover, the typical "economic flow control" scheme involves a degree of interference with the market-
place that is even more extreme than the Massachusetts program invalidated in West Lynn Creamery. To be
truly effective, by coercing the delivery of all or practically all of the locally-generated waste to a local facility,
the fees or taxes that fund the subsidy are not paid by parties that transport waste to another state. Instead, they
are paid by parties that had previously engaged in, or had the opportunity to engage in, interstate commerce and
ostensibly would have continued to do so in the absence of the economic flow control program. Accordingly,
the scheme truly acts as a regulatory program because it has the effect of eliminating or sharply curtailing inter-
state commerce.
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program. 7 Yet, protectionist intent or sentiment is, alone, grounds for invalida-
tion of a state or local fee or flow control program. 8
The Federal Anti-Injunction Act59 should not present a substantial obstacle to
the maintenance of federal district court jurisdiction in cases involving economic
flow control programs. That statute precludes a federal district court from
"enjoin[ing], suspend[ing] or restrain[ing] the assessment, levy or collection of
any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had
57. Several waste haulers and trade associations are currently plaintiffs in lawsuits that challenge the legali-
ty of efforts by various New Jersey counties and their authorities to impose environmental investment changes
("EICs") and mandate in-district weighing as a means of assessing the EICs. See, e.g., NSWMA v. Board of
Chosen Freeholders of Burlington County, N.J., Super. Ct. Law, Div. No. BUR-L-01622-98 (filed May 28,
1998). The EICs are collected from parties that do not use the disposal facility operated by the county or its
authority. There is currently no valid statutory authority for the imposition and enforcement of EICs by county
authorities that are established as utility authorities. Those authorities are authorized to collect "solid waste
system charges ... for the use of services of the solid waste system." N.J.S.A. 40:14B-22.1. Some counties
have established pollution control financing authorities that, likewise, are only authorized to assess charges
against those using the authority's facilities. N.J.S.A. 40:37C-6. In both of these instances, these entities lack
the power to impose charges and fees beyond the authorized service fees.
In addition, other counties have established county improvement authorities to operate their solid waste dis-
posal systems. These authorities, too, are authorized to establish facility charges for the use of the authority's
facilities. N.J.S.A. 40:37A-57. In addition to these facility charges, county improvement authorities may also
collect charges from any government unit within its jurisdiction or from any owner or occupant of real property
situated in a constituent municipality. N.J.S.A. 40:37A-57. Although the powers of the county improvement
authorities are thus broader than those of utility authorities and pollution control finance authorities, their pow-
ers do not extend to assessing a charge against those who collect solid waste and dispose of it at out-of-district
facilities. Rather, this additional authorization is limited to making assessments directly against constituent
municipalities or owners or occupants of real property in those municipalities; charges against solid waste col-
lectors are not authorized.
Moreover, the EICs are typically implemented through a mandatory in-district weighing program that is,
itself, burdensome and unconstitutional. As part and parcel of their efforts to impose EICs, several counties or
their authorities have created mandatory weighing requirements under which haulers of solid waste are required
to drive to a specifically designated facility prior to ultimate disposal. These requirements are unduly burden-
some and illegal. The only real purpose of the programs is to enable the collection of the EIC, an effort that,
itself, is clearly unauthorized by statute and unconstitutional. Moreover, the asserted purposes of the weighing
programs could easily be gained by other, less intrusive measures that involve neither in-district nor in-State
weighing-such as monitoring waste generation rates and the effectiveness of recycling programs.
Clearly, the desire to collect the EIC is what motivates the creation and enforcement of weighing programs.
Yet, mandatory weighing programs can and do have significant consequences on the operations of a solid waste
business. Such requirements may effectively prevent a hauling company from utilizing a single truck for near-
by customers that happen to be located in different counties. Haulers are required to take detours to weighing
facilities for no real purpose, diversions that increase traffic and disposal costs. Mandatory weighing schemes
also burden a hauler's freedom to utilize solid waste facilities that are not "designated" by requiring that solid
waste vehicles visit those sites-whether or not they are to be used for disposal.
Mandatory weighing programs are an adjunct of an illegal program to assess EICs. They improperly and
unnecessarily increase costs. And, regardless of the standard of review utilized pursuant to the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution, they burden protected commerce.
58. See, e.g., Healy v. The Beer Institute, Inc., 491 U.S. 324 (1989) (invalidating a Connecticut beer pricing
affirmation statute as "just the kind of competing and interlocking local economic regulation that the
Commerce Clause was meant to preclude"). Statutes that evidence protectionism are invalid, even if they nei-
ther facially discriminate nor impose, in fact, a disproportionate burden on interstate commerce. See also Hunt,
Governor of N.C. v. Washington Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Bradley v. Public Utils. Comm'n,
289 U.S. 92, 95 (1933); Buck v. Kuykendall, Dir. of Pub. Works of the State of Wash., 267 U.S. 307, 315
(1925).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1993 & Supp. 1998).
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in the courts of that state.""0 The provision has traditionally been interpreted fair-
ly broadly. For example, in National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma
Tax Commission, the Court, in a 9-0 decision, concluded that refund actions were
generally not pursuable under § 1983 in light of the unspecified "background
principle" that federal courts not interfere with state taxes.6 While the federal
statute provides that state courts must provide a "clear and certain remedy," most
previous efforts to oppose dismissals (without prejudice) on the ground that state
courts are traditionally biased against tax-related claimants have not been suc-
cessful.
Moreover, it is important to note the following:
(a) The Court has interpreted the Act as also precluding federal court declara-
tory relief against state taxes;
62
(b) Comity and federalism principles also act to preclude federal courts from
entertaining damages actions when state law furnishes an adequate legal remedy;83
and
(c) Even state courts cannot issue declaratory or injunctive relief under § 1983
(or provide for an award of damages or attorney's fees) against state taxes.
Accordingly, when a "tax" is involved-which is, of course, the critical ques-
tion-Sections 1983/1988 cannot be a basis upon which courts issue injunctive
or declaratory relief in state tax cases where there is an adequate remedy at law.
Some fairly recent Commerce Clause cases that involved undeniable "tax"
measures have been heard by federal district courts and, in some cases, appeals
courts on their merits. A claim against Hennepin County, Minnesota, regarding
its solid waste management fee ordinance (Ordinance No. 15, imposing a fee on
waste generated within the County), was dismissed without prejudice on the
ground that the Anti-Injunction Act divested the district court of jurisdiction. 4
The court did, however, retain jurisdiction over a claim that the "environmentally
inferior" provision in state legislation (which included a section providing for the
payment into a trust fund of a per-ton disposal fee if an "inferior" method is uti-
lized) was unconstitutional.65 The opinion did not refer to any effort by the
defendant to contest jurisdiction. In the district court's ruling in Oehrleins,
Hennepin County argued that its flow control ordinance imposed a "tax"
(although the only specific reference to monies in the ordinance concerned
enforcement penalties). 6 District Judge Doty responded that the label given the
measure by the County was irrelevant; the proper test is:
60. Id.
61. 515 U.S. 582 (1995).
62. California v. Grace Brethern Church, 457 U.S. 393 (1982); American Landfill, Inc. v. Stark/
Tuscarawas/Wayne Joint Solid Waste Management Dist., 1999 FED App. 0035P (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 1999) (find-
ing that a statutorily authorized "generation fee," collected by the owner or operator of a disposal facility on the
basis of tonnage or cubic yardage, was a "tax"). But see Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v.
Bayh, Governor of Ind., 975 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1053 (1993) (disposal surcharge
was not a tax); National Solid Wastes Mmgt. Ass'n. v. Voinovich, 959 E2d 590 (6th Cir. 1992) (same).
63. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981).
64. Ben Oehrleins and Sons and Daughter, Inc. v. Hennepin County, 922 E Supp. 1396 (1996).
65. National Solid Waste Management Association v. Williams, 877 E Supp. 1367 (D. Minn. 1995).
66. Ben Oehrleins, 922 ESupp. at 1403.
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[the] purpose underlying the ordinance. If it is primarily a revenue-raising mea-
sure, then it may be considered a tax. Marigold Foods v. Redalen, 809 E Supp.
714, 719 (D. Minn. 1992). On the other hand, if it is primarily regulatory or
punitive in nature, then it is not a tax. Id.; see also American Petrofina Co. of
Tex. v. Nance, 859 F2d 840, 841 (10th Cir. 1988) ("the mere fact that a statute
raises revenue does not imprint upon it the characteristics of a law by which the
taxing power is exercised").
6 7
Ordinance 12 clearly raises revenue. However, the "tipping fee" which the
County has been able to charge is not the primary feature of the ordinance.
Rather, the ordinance regulates the flow of waste originated in Hennepin County.
The revenue raised, while undeniably significant, is incident to the requirement
that waste must go to the County's designated facilities. As it is not a tax, the
court was not precluded from considering the constitutionality of Ordinance 12.1
The Eighth Circuit agreed with Judge Doty's reasoning, noting that the primary
purpose of the program was regulatory.9 The court's analysis provides strong
support for the argument that economic flow control programs ought to be
viewed as regulatory, rather than tax, measures and their effects upon commerce
viewed in their totality.7" The franchise/generator fee, alone, need not produce an
anti-competitive effect. What causes the effect is the combination of the assess-
ment with the reduced tip fee, and the fact that the resulting "system" is imple-
mented with the express purpose of retaining waste streams has, in practice,
obtained the hoped-for economic effect. A franchise fee, without ordinance pro-
visions which mandate that waste haulers obtain a franchise, would be of no
assistance to the local government (i.e., it would be voluntary). Similarly, a gen-
erator fee must be mandatory-clearly an act of governmental regulation, rather
than voluntary, for the system to succeed. Likewise, the franchise/generator fee
must be coupled with the reduced tip fees to order to make the entity either
"whole" or actually in better economic condition by undercutting disposal-relat-
ed charges at other accessible facilities. Both aspects of the program must be
viewed together. They are designed to operate in tandem, and their economic
impact in the affected marketplace occurs through their concurrent application.
Properly alleged, economic flow control complaints need not contend that the
franchise or generator fee, in and of itself, is unconstitutional; instead, the asser-
tion would be that the economic flow control system violates the Commerce
Clause.
The purpose of the locally imposed fee is not to raise revenues per se-instead,
it is to create, indirectly, a flow control program that reaches essentially the same
result as an ordinance that mandates delivery to the designated landfill. Such
fees are not taxes. They are akin, from an Anti-Injunction Act perspective, to the
fees set forth in the state statute litigated in NSWMA v. Williams and the flow
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 115 E3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1997).
70. See also West Lynn Cremery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 198-200 (1994) (holding that, in dormant
Commerce Clause cases, reviewing courts must examine the challenged activity or program "as a whole").
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control ordinance invalidated by Judge Doty.71 Likewise, the courts that evaluat-
ed the economic flow control initiatives in Ohio and Connecticut obviously did
not see fit to determine that they lacked jurisdiction.
Economic flow control schemes need not always result in a situation in which
the tip fee formerly imposed at a preferred or designated facility is replaced, to
the penny, with a combination fee or assessment and a reduced tipping charge.
However, there is typically some economic incentive that precludes true competi-
tion in the marketplace and which acts to balkanize waste movement by effec-
tively "forcing" waste haulers to use a particular facility.
B. "Intrastate" Flow Control Ordinances
Similarly, "bifurcated" or "as enforced bifurcated" ordinances constitute an
obvious effort to retain, within a flow control system, locally-generated wastes.
In instances in which the local jurisdiction is not within "striking distance" of a
state border, such ordinances often have their intended effect. Yet, flow control
measures, whether directly imposed, as in Carbone, or implemented "through the
back door," have serious, adverse consequences.
A recent study conducted by the National Economic Research Associates
("NERA") noted that
[a]lthough flow controls have been imposed for over 20 years, they have only
recently become a serious concern as the variety and accessibility of alternatives
has increased. The private sector responded to rapidly rising disposal costs in
the mid-1980s to the early 1990s by building more disposal capacity. While the
number of landfills in the U. S. has dropped rather dramatically, landfill capaci-
ty has not. In fact, capacity has been increasing in many regions of the country.
As a result, disposal charges are no longer increasing, but rather falling as dis-
posal facilities compete for business. In addition, the disparity has been exacer-
bated by local governments relying on flow control to finance recycling and
other waste management programs. Local governments have imposed fees and
surcharges at flow control facilities. Third, some governments became more
aggressive regarding flow control as waste streams diminished at least in part
because of government regulations and programs. Paper recycling, for example,
has eliminated an important fuel stock from resource recovery plants. 2
Flow control requirements are opposed by environmental groups, such as the
New York Public Interest Research Group, the National Resources Defense
Council, the National Wildlife Federation, Clean Water Act, and Greenpeace,
71. See Ben Oehrleins, 922 F Supp. at 1396; National Solid Waste Management Ass'n., 877 F. Supp. at
1367.
72. National Economic Research Associates, The Cost of Flow Control, May 3, 1995, at 5 (hereinafter
"NERA Study").
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because-as the United States Environmental Protection Agency pointed out73-
flow control mandates serve no legitimate environmental purpose. Indeed, the
proliferation of flow control requirements has led to an increased number of inef-
ficient, often antiquated, and poorly operated, non-cost-effective facilities. Re-
gional intergovernmental cooperation and the development of truly regional
waste management facilities has, all too often, not occurred. Certainly, "[i]f
every municipality or county decided to site its own landfill, recyclery, and com-
posting facility and instituted flow control measures, there would be a great mis-
allocation of resources and an undesirable environmental outcome. 74
Flow control requirements add "approximately $10 per ton, or 33 percent, to
the average landfill disposal charge (tip fee) nationwide... $11.50 per ton, or 23
percent, to the average incinerator disposal charge (tip fee) nationwide . . . and
approximately $14 per ton, or 33 percent, to the average transfer station disposal
charge (tip fee) nationwide. 75 Moreover,
[b]y mandating that local waste haulers use particular management facilities, the
haulers are prevented from using more environmentally sound alternatives that
may exist elsewhere. The Sierra Club and other environmental groups have
rightly pointed out that such regulations often inhibit the development of alter-
native waste management options and, in some cases, disrupt preexisting waste
recovery and recycling efforts. Flow control laws unnecessarily inhibit the abil-
ity of recyclers and other ecological entrepreneurs to compete in the market-
place and provide more economical waste management options. For that rea-
son, and because flow control has frequently been used to finance costly and
inefficient incinerators, flow control is opposed by the New York Public Interest
Research Group, the National Resources Defense Council, the National Wildlife
Federation, Clean Water Action, and Greenpeace, among others. Those groups
maintain that in practice it is likely that the environmental costs of flow control
outweigh its benefits.76
73. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste, Municipal and Solid Waste
Division, Report to Congress, Flow Controls and Municipal Solid Waste 11-6 (March 1995) ("There is no evi-
dence that flow control either positively or negatively impacts the statutorily assured level of environmental
protection, because the underlying regulatory requirements are controlling."). The Agency also emphasized
that "[tihere are no data showing that flow controls are essential either for the development of new solid waste
capacity or for the long term achievement of State and local goals for source reduction, reuse and recycling."
Id. at ES-5.
74. Turner, supra note 3, at 208. See also Jonathan H. Adler, The Failure of Flow Control, 18 REG. 11, 13
(1995).
75. NERA Study, supra note 72, at 1-2. In addition, several of the pre- and post-Carbone decisions have
noted the significant and artificial economic dislocations created by flow control mandates. See, e.g., Waste
Sys. Corp. v. County of Martin, Minn., 985 F2d 1381, 1387 (8th Cir. 1993) ($72 per ton disposal fee at desig-
nated facility; $30 at nearby facility); J. Filiberto Sanitation, Inc. v New Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 857
F.2d 913, 916 (3d Cit. 1988) (flow control resulted in $100 per ton disposal charge, as opposed to rates
"approximately half" of that at accessible facilities); Container Corp. of Carolina v. Mecklenburg County, No.
92 CV-154-MV, 1995 WL 360185 (W.D.N.C. June 14, 1992) ($37.50 per ton/$29.50 per ton).
76. Adler, supra note 74, at 11, 13. See also Sidney M. Wolf, Congressional Bailout of Flow Control:
Saving the Burning Beast, 7 VILL. ENvr'L. L.J. 263 (1996).
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These significant economic and environmental arguments against flow control
measures are applicable to most flow control programs-regardless of the
method by which they were created. For example, by selecting as the designated
landfill a facility that may not, and all-too-often does not, satisfy best available
landfill technology standards, local governments clearly have not sought to pro-
mote environmental protection through their flow control mandates. Flow con-
trol requirements are imposed for economic, not environmental, reasons; and, as
the National Solid Wastes Management Association demonstrated in a report on
flow control programs in Ohio, the requirements adopted by that state's political
subdivisions have increased costs to generators and transporters of waste without
providing any environmental benefit." The report noted that the selection of cer-
tain landfills as "designated" flow controlled facilities means that many tons of
wastes are disposed of at less than state-of-the-art facilities.78 Moreover, the cre-
ation of county/district flow control programs in Ohio significantly reduced
inter-county and inter-district waste movements, resulting in a balkanization of
the marketplace.79
Flow control requirements are illegal, wasteful, and counterproductive." Yet,
they continue, despite the Court's unambiguous ruling in Carbone. An "intra-
state" flow control ordinance is an example of post-Carbone efforts to restrict the
movement of waste. Such requirements balkanize waste movements. They pre-
clude the development of regional disposal solutions, in spite of the United
States Environmental Protection Agency's view that multi-governmental regional
sites are cost-effective and far more likely to be managed in an environmentally
protective manner. 1 They threaten the national marketplace in solid waste man-
agement by endorsing in-state balkanizations that cannot be squared with the
goals of a national economic unit or with the particular need for the efficient,
environmentally protective disposal of solid waste.82
77. National Solid Wastes Management Association, The Effects of Designation and District Fees on Solid
Waste Management in Ohio 4, 5 (1993).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 4.
80. As a result of the loss of state regulatory flow control authority in New Jersey, "rates at 14 public-sec-
tor facilities" have decreased. "Among the most dramatic are a reduction at the Bergen County transfer station
for municipal trash from $101.88 [per ton] to $64. The Gloucester County incinerator cut fees to $56.37 from
$101.32 and the Passaic County transfer station reduced its rates to $54 from $110.23 . Mary Greczyn,
N.J Flow Control Ends, WASTE NEWS, Dec. 22, 1997, at 10.
81. 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978, 50,989 (1991) (in issuing the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA") "Subtitle D" regulations applicable to municipal solid waste landfills, 40 C.ER. Part 258, the
Agency emphasized that "small landfills tend to be poorly located and designed, and operate at the high end of
the cost-per-ton scale. As a result, small communities have a number of strong incentives to regionalize and, in
fact, many of them have moved or are currently moving to regional facilities'). These regulations apply to all
facilities that accept waste derived from households, regardless of the geographic areas served by the landfill.
82. For a brief examination of Commerce Clause jurisprudence in the context of a state effort to restrict
landfill siting and expansion through an uncodified "planning" process, see Note, The Dormant Commerce
Clause and the Massachusetts Landfill Moratorium: Are National Market Principles Adequately Served?, 24
B.C. ENvr'L. AFF. L. RE. 425 (1997).
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The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Oerhleins instructed the district court to apply
the "Pike" balancing test, rather than the "per se" test employed in Carbone.3
However, the Supreme Court has made clear that import/export restrictions
imposed by political subdivisions within a state that restrict the movement of
waste to and from other areas within the same state are just as violative of the
Commerce Clause as are "state border" restrictions. In Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources, the Supreme Court
noted that "a State (or one of its political subdivisions) may not avoid the stric-
tures of the Commerce Clause by curtailing the movement of articles of com-
merce through subdivisions of the State, rather than through the State itself.84
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison stands for the same proposition.85
The United States generates a minimum of 180 million tons of solid waste
each year. 6 Indeed, current estimates are in excess of 200 million tons." While
a significant amount-as high as 15 million tonsa-moves in commerce
between states in a well-established national marketplace, substantially larger
volumes are shipped between political subdivisions of the same state. Regional
wastesheds exist, both within and outside of states. Moreover, it has become
increasingly difficult to site and permit new disposal facilities. Accordingly, it is
of considerable importance to the national economy that states and localities not
seek to isolate themselves from the national and intrastate/regional markets in
solid waste transportation and disposal.
Flow control and export restriction requirements disrupt those markets by
"hoarding" wastes, making it difficult for operators to justify the continuation of
disposal activities at costly state-of-the-art landfills. The Supreme Court has
specifically rejected "any suggestion that a state tax or regulation affecting inter-
83. It should be noted that even seemingly non-discriminatory measures have been invalidated by courts
that have utilized the Pike standard. Pike, itself, is an example. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137
(1970). See also Brown-Forman Distillers, Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986) (liquor
price control statute invalidated although it applied evenhandedly); South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (in-state timber processing requirement struck down); Kassel, Dir. of Transp. v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (statute prohibiting longer trucks invalidated); Great Atd.
& Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, Health Officer of Miss., 424 U.S. 366 (1976) (Pike test applied to strike down statute
not justified by purported safety concerns); Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, Governor
of Ind., 975 E2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1992) (Indiana legislation impacted importation of waste); Continental Ill.
Corp. v. Lewis, 827 E2d 1517 (11 th Cir. 1987) (Florida statute had effect of creating restrictions on out-of-state
banks); Middle South Energy, Inc. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 772 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1985); Atlantic
Prince, Ltd. v. Jorling, 710 E Supp. 893 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (New York State ban on longer commercial fishing
vessels invalidated). Dean Milk is a classic example of an invalid facially neutral measure. Dean Milk Co. v.
City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). See Turner, supra note 3, at 241-42.
84. 504 U.S. 353 (1992).
85. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
86. See, e.g., Interstate Transportation of Solid Waste: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Transportation
and Hazardous Materials of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1991) (statement
of Don R. Clay, then Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Environmental
Protection Agency).
87. Franklin Associates, in a report prepared for the U.S. EPA, estimated that 209 million tons of municipal
solid waste was generated in 1994. U.S. EPA, Characterization of Municipal Solid Waste in the United States,
1996 UPDATE, FRANKLIN AsSOCIATEs LTD., June 1997, at 2.
88. A recent summary of 1995 data concluded that "[t]he total amount of solid waste exported by states for
disposal in 1995 was 17.3 million tons." Edward R. Repa, Interstate Movement 1995 Update, WAsTE AGE, June
1997, at 42, 45.
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state commerce is immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny because it attaches
only to a 'local' or intrastate activity."' The Court has likewise ruled, on several
occasions, that the transportation of commodities, including waste, constitutes
"commerce." That traffic in "waste"-whether solid, hazardous, or infectious-
is "commerce" that is protected by the Commerce Clause cannot be seriously
questioned. In Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Court held that New Jersey could
not prohibit the importation of out-of-state waste for disposal in the State." The
Court expressly rejected the notion that "'valueless' out-of-state wastes" de-
served "no constitutional protection."91 Instead, the Court declared that "[a]ll
objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection; none is excluded
by definition at the outset."92
Likewise, in "dormant" Commerce Clause cases, lower courts have interpreted
the Commerce Clause to encompass discriminatory and protectionist measures
aimed at other political subdivisions within the same state. 3 For example, in
Container Corp. of Carolina v. Mecklenburg County, the court emphasized that
"there is no relevant distinction between regulations imposed by a state and those
imposed by the County since restrictions from both levels of government are
subject to the same limitations of the Commerce Clause.' Accordingly, the
enactments of counties are also subject to the Commerce Clause." The court in
Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Southeast Alabama Solid Waste Disposal Authority
employed much the same reasoning.9
Additional decisions that have invalidated measures which sought to or had the
effect of impeding the transportation, disposal, export, or import of waste
between counties within a state include Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County,
Georgia," GSW, Inc. v. Long County, Georgia.,97 Southeast Arkansas Landfill,
Inc. v. Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology,9" and Southern
States Landfill v. Georgia Department of Natural Resources.9 The courts,
including the district court in Oehrleins,0 ° that have invalidated seemingly
89. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 615 (1981).
90. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
91. Id. at 622.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Ben Oehrleins & Sons & Daughter, Inc. v. Hennepin County, Minn., 922 E Supp. 1396 (D.
Minn. 1996); Poor Richard's, Inc. v. Ramsey County, Minn., C.A. No. 4-95-306 (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 1996);
Environmental Waste Reductions, Inc. v. Georgia Dept. of Natural Resources, C.A. No. 1:94-CV-1498-FMH
(Nov. 30, 1994), South Central Pa. Waste Haulers Assoc. v. Bedford-Fulton-Huntingdon Solid Waste Auth.,
C.A. No. 1:CV-93-1318 (N.D. Pa. June 24, 1994); Mid-American Waste Sys., Inc. v. Fisher, No. C-2-94-493
(S.D. Ohio May 13, 1994); Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Town of Gray and Reg'l Waste Sys., Inc., No. 6654, slip
op. (Me. Sup. Ct., Oct. 15, 1993).
94. No. 3:92cv-154-MU, 1995 WL 360185 (W.D.N.C. June 22, 1992).
95. 814 E Supp. 1566 (M.D. Ala. 1993), aff'd without opinion, 29 E3d 641 (1 lth Cir. 1994).
96. 828 F. Supp. 52 (M.D. Ga. 1993).
97. 999 E2d 1508 (1lth Cir. 1993).
98. 981 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1992).
99. 801 F Supp. 725 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
100. Ben Oehrleins and Sons and Daughter, Inc. v. Hennepin County, 922 F. Supp. 1396 (D. Minn. 1996).
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"intrastate" measures or restrictions on intrastate movement,"1 or that have
expansively interpreted congressional authority to regulate pursuant to the
Commerce Clause have not utilized a uniform approach. There appear to be
three major justifications for their positions:
(1) Local and state restrictions on the interjurisdictional movement of waste are
inherently a matter of interstate commerce-a proposition clearly set forth in the
Supreme Court's decisions in Philadelphia v. New Jersey,' Fort Gratiot
Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources,"3
Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, Governor of Alabama, 04 Oregon Waste
Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality,0 5 and Carbone.' Solid
waste transportation, disposal, and incineration issues are matters of national
concern. In addition, the physical act of the transportation of waste to a final
disposal or processing facility is but one of a number of commercial transac-
tions that have been seamlessly linked in commerce. The original raw materials
that end up as "waste" were collected or mined and manufactured into goods
that were transported in commerce into cities and counties and purchased or
otherwise utilized there." 7 Moreover, collectors and transporters of waste, as
well as operators of disposal and recycling facilities, not only participate in
these acts of commerce but also routinely purchase supplies and equipment, sell
collection and disposal/processing services, and finance new and expanded
activities, all in interstate commerce. Accordingly, both solid waste and the par-
ties that engage in its management for commercial reasons are inherently "in,"
as well as "affect," commerce.
101. But see the following decisions, which held that restrictions on the intrastate movement of waste are
not addressed by the Commerce Clause: U & I Sanitation v. City of Columbus, 998 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Neb.
1998); Waste Management of Mich. v. Ingham County, 941 E Supp. 656 (W.D. Mich. 1996); Vince Refuse
Serv., Inc. v. Clark County Solid Waste Management District, No. C-3-93-319 (S.D. Ohio March 7, 1995);
Citizens for Logical Alternatives and Responsible Env't, Inc. v. Clare County, 536 N.W2d 286 (Mich. App.
1995).
102. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
103. 504 U.S. 353 (1992).
104. 504 U.S. 334 (1992).
105. 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
106. See also Quincy College & Sem. Corp. v. Burlington N., 405 U.S. 906 (1971) ("It is well-established
that an intrastate railroad line which forms part of a larger industrial line can indeed have a[] substantial eco-
nomic effect upon the interstate commerce carried on by that line."); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
(the act of growing wheat "affected" interstate commerce).
107. As such, the previous interstate movement of the commodities that become "garbage" upon their con-
sumption - their delivery from manufacturers to distributors to retailers to consumers - is sufficient to both
create and sustain application of the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Carolina, 61 F.3d 917 (10th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Oliver, 60 E3d 547 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Williams, 51 F.3d 1004 (11th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 900 (1995); United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 890 E Supp. 67 (D.RR. 1995);
United States v. Green, 64 E3d 664 (6th Cir. 1995) (unpublished opinion available at 1995 WL 492913); Ramey
v. United States, 24 F.3d 602 (4th Cir. 1994). See also Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977);
United States v. Wilks, 58 E3d 1518 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Rankin, 64 E3d 338 (8th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d 1379 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Pelkey, 61 E3d 914 (9th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Mosby, 60 F.3d 454 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hanna, 55 E3d 1456 (9th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Bramble, 894 F Supp. 1384 (D. Haw. 1995); United States v. Edwards, 894 F. Supp. 340 (E.D.
Wis. 1995); United States v. Williams, 893 F. Supp. 617 (S.D.W. Va. 1995); United States v. Brown, 893 F.
Supp. II (M.D.N.C. 1995); United States v. Campbell, 891 E Supp. 210 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
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(2) The proliferation of seemingly "local" regulations or taxes could balkanize"'8
commerce between states;109 and
(3) The scope of the "dormant" Commerce Clause has consistently been viewed
as broadly as the "proactive" Clause, and courts have, virtually without excep-
tion, found many seemingly local activities to be "protected" commerce-i.e.,
"interstate" commerce. The Supreme Court has made clear, on several occa-
sions-most recently in Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,
Maine," ° that the scope of commerce protected by the "dormant" Commerce
Clause is as broad as the "congressional" aspect of the Clause." A local
requirement that commodities not be exported (or imported) to or from other
political subdivisions of the same state is incompatible with the scope of federal
regulation of numerous seemingly "in-state" parties and activities.
The Court's opinion in United States v. Lopez"2 has not altered the time-hon-
ored principle'13 that even a purportedly "local" restriction that is expressly
108. Under widespread so-called 'intrastate' [flow control], a company wishing to offer waste services
in State A must locate its disposal facility in State B and must also erect a separate facility in State A
to compete for State B's waste. Each facility is both denied access to local waste and forced to com-
pete at a location-disadvantage to preferred facilities in other states. Even though there is interstate
competition in theory, in practice such designation "violates the principle of the unitary national
market by handicapping out-of-state competitors, thus artificially encouraging in-state production
[at the preferred facilities] ......
Ben Oehrleins & Sons & Daughter, Inc. v. Hennepin County, petition for writ of certiorari, supra note 9, at 24-
25 (quoting West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 198 (1994)).
109. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, Cotm'r of Agric. and Mkts, 336 U.S. 525, 538-39
(1949); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979). The Court, in Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437
(1992), in invalidating an Oklahoma statute, noted that
[t]he practical effect [of the legislation] must be evaluated not only by considering the consequences
of the statute itself, but also by considering how the challenged statute may interact with the legiti-
mate regulatory regimes of the other States and what effect would arise if not one, but many or
every, State adopted similar legislation.
Id. at 453 (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)).
110. 520 U.S. 564 (1997).
111. See also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. at 326 n.2 ("The definition of 'commerce' is the same when
relied on to strike down or restrict state legislation as when relied on to support some exertion of federal control
or regulation."); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978) (declaring the absence of a "two-tiered"
approach to the definition of "commerce").
112. 514 U.S. 549(1995).
113. That Lopez did not signal a reversal, or even a substantial retreat, from federal Commerce Clause
authority has become abundantly clear, both from other Supreme Court decisions and a plethora of lower court
rulings. See, e.g., Russell L. Weaver, Lopez and the Federalization of Criminal Law, 98 W VA. L. REv. 815,
838-41 (1996) ("'Lopez challenges' have not been well-received"); Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94
MICH. L. REv. 674 (1995); Stephen M. McJohn, The Impact of United States v. Lopez: The New Hybrid
Commerce Clause, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 1 (1995); United States v. Wilson, 73 E3d 675, 685 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he
Supreme Court reaffirmed, rather than overturned, the previous half century of Commerce Clause precedent in
Lopez .... ). See also United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669 (1995); Ramey v. United States, 514 U.S. 1103
(1995); Moore v. United States, 514 U.S. 1102 (1995); Overstreet v. United States, 514 U.S. 1113 (1995);
Osteen v. United States, 514 U.S. 1097 (1995); Allied-Bruce Terminix Corp. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
See also Elizabeth C. Price, Constitutional Fidelity and the Commerce Clause: A Reply to Professor Ackerman,
48 SYRACUSE L. REv. 139 (1998); W. John Moore, A Landmark Decision? Maybe Not, 27 NAT'L L.J. 1131
(1995).
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directed only at other activity within a state may "affect" interstate commerce', 4
and, therefore, be subject to Commerce Clause scrutiny.' Numerous deci-
sions-each well known as demonstrating the breadth of the commerce power11
-also justify a determination that measures that preclude the shipment of wastes
between political subdivisions of the same state are violative per se of the
Commerce Clause. For example, the Supreme Court held, in Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, that since a motel once received service items from
locations in other states, the operation of the motel was an activity within "inter-
state commerce" for purposes of application of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.117
In Katzenbach v. McClung, the Court similarly concluded that Title II of the Act
applied to a restaurant in Birmingham, Alabama because it had previously pur-
chased meat from suppliers located in other states. 18 Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar involved a finding that a minimum fee schedule for real estate lawyers con-
stituted "interstate commerce" because a portion of the funds for the purchasing
of homes came from loans guaranteed by federal agencies. 19 In McLain v. Real
Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc., the Court ruled that an antitrust complaint
regarding purported price-fixing of brokerage commissions involved an activity
within "interstate commerce."'120 The Court, in FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.,
determined that an alleged agreement to establish fees for local title searches
would affect interstate commerce, so as to trigger application of the Sherman
Act. 21 In Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, the Court concluded that a conspiracy
regarding operating privileges for surgeons affected interstate commerce because
(1) some of the procedures were performed on out-of-state residents; and (2)
some of the medications and supplies were originally purchased out-of-state.22
114. Numerous courts have, subsequent to the Court's opinion in Lopez, affirmed the reach of the commerce
power. Among the many examples are United States v. Olin Corp., 107 E3d 1506 (11 th Cir. 1997) (upholding
liability provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act); United
States v. Hampshire, 95 F3d 999 (10th Cit. 1996), aff'g, 892 E Supp. 1327 (D. Kan. 1995) (constitutionality of
the Child Support Recovery Act); United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cit. 1996) (same); United States v.
Lerebours, 87 E3d 582 (1st Cir. 1996) (prohibitions on drug trafficking); United States v. Tisor, 96 E3d 370
(9th Cir. 1996) (distribution of controlled substances); United States v. Tucker, 90 E3d 1135 (6th Cir. 1996)
(cajacking). See also Mary C. Carty, Note, Doe v. Doe and the Violence Against Women Act: A Post-Lopez
Commerce Clause Analysis, 71 ST. JOftN'S L. REv. 465 (1997); Debbie Ellis, Note, A Lopez Legacy? The
Federalism Debate Renewed, But Not Resolved, 17 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 85 (1996).
115. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537 (1985); Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
116. For a recent example, see Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univ., No. 96-1814 (4th
Cir. Dec. 23, 1997) (upholding constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act).
117. 379 U.S. 241 (1964). "If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the
operation which applies the squeeze." Id. at 258 (quoting United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n,
336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949)). See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (intrastate
activity that has "such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions" falls within the scope of the Commerce
Clause).
118. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). The Katzenbach Court emphasized that the Commerce Clause "extends to activi-
ties ... which directly or indirectly burden or obstruct interstate commerce." Id. at 302.
119. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
120. 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
121. 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
122. 500 U.S. 322 (1991). See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism:
The Supreme Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2213 (1996).
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Other examples of federal authority, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, over
seemingly "local" activities abound.123 Katzenbach24 and Heart of Atlanta
Motel2 are examples of decisions that have routinely supported congressional
authority 26 over the instrumentalities of commerce-indeed, the decisions broad-
ly noted the federal government's ability to use those instrumentalities to address
social concerns. 27 United States v. Darby,'28 Perez v. United States,29 Russell v.
United States,3 ' and United States v. Bishop.3 are among the other numerous
examples of the breadth of the "proactive" aspect of the Commerce Clause. 32
The Supreme Court's recent decision, in the consolidated cases of Printz v.
United States and Mack v. United States, likewise fails to signal a retrenchment
from an expansive view of the scope of the Commerce Clause.133 The consolidat-
ed cases examined the constitutionality of various sections of the Brady Act, 3 '
most notably a provision that requires local law enforcement officials to perform
background checks on prospective handgun purchasers. The Court's decision-
holding that the "interim" background check provision violates the Tenth
Amendment of the Constitution-does nothing to lessen the scope of Federal
power under the Commerce Clause. 3 Given that the Supreme Court held, in
Philadelphia v. New Jersey and Hughes v. Oklahoma, that "[t]he definition of
'commerce' is the same when relied on to strike down or restrict state legislation
123. See, e.g., United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942); Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (regulation of intrastate rail shipments approved);
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) (transactions at stockyards were not merely "local" with
regard to Commerce Clause applicability).
124. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
125. Id.
126. See also Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (even a purely "intrastate" activity may affect
interstate commerce); Polish Alliance v. Labor Bd., 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1944) ("[R]epresentative of many others
throughout the country, the total incidence of which if left unchecked may well become far-reaching in its harm
to commerce.").
127. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit has issued several opinions that conflict with its reasoning in Oehrleins. In
United States v. Jensen, 69 E3d 906 (8th Cir. 1995), the court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a), which addresses
money laundering, was within Commerce Clause authority, despite the fact that the activity did not involve a
transaction across state lines, because the seemingly localized activities influenced or affected interstate com-
merce. Likewise, in United States v. Bell, 90 F.3d 318 (8th Cir. 1996), the court sustained 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1), which imposes a nationwide prohibition on drug trafficking, although the defendant did not traverse
a state line. In United States v. Monteleone, 77 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir. 1996), a statute that prohibits the distribu-
tion of firearms to convicted felons was upheld. Indeed, in United States v. McMasters, 90 F.3d 1394 (8th Cir.
1996), the court, in sustaining a federal law regarding arson, reasoned that Lopez imposes no more than a
requirement that the local activity have a "de minimis" effect on interstate commerce. These rulings strongly
suggest that the Eighth Circuit ignored the Court's earlier rulings, including the decision in Camps New-
found/Owatonna.
128. 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (Fair Labor Standards Act).
129. 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (loansharking may be controlled even though activity does not involve interstate
activity).
130. 471 U.S. 858 (1985) (federal enforcement against arson).
131. 66 E3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995) (carjackings appropriate subject of Federal enforcement, even if offense
occurred wholly within one state).
132. It is difficult, if not impossible, given that the breadth of the "dormant" aspect of the Commerce Clause
is as broad as the "proactive" (i.e., congressional) aspect of the Clause, to reconcile these decisions with the
notion that an absolute prohibition on the shipment of wastes between political subdivisions of a state is some-
how either beyond the scope of the Clause or does not trigger the "virtually per se rule of invalidity," as set
forth in decisions, such as Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
133. No. 95-1478 (June 27, 1997).
134. 18 USC § 922 (Supp. 1993).
135. No. 95-1478 (June 27, 1997).
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as when relied on to support some exertion of federal control or legislation,"3
there was some concern, particularly since the Court's opinion in Lopez, that the
Court would seek to narrow the scope of the "federal" side of the Commerce
Clause, thus restricting the ability of litigants to challenge measures, such as
"bifurcated" flow control ordinances and regulations.
Printz/Mack provides no reason for discomfort.137 Although the Court was
quite divided, the plurality opinion and all but one of the dissenting opinions
agreed that the Brady Act was within the scope of the commerce power. Indeed,
Justice Stevens' dissent (joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) begins
by specifically noting that "there can be no question that [the Commerce Clause]
adequately supports the regulation of commerce in handguns effected by the
Brady Act" -even if the purchase and use of the gun occurs within a single
state.138 Contrarily, the plurality opinion rested upon the fact that the Act com-
pelled local police officers to conduct background checks and ensure that certain
forms were properly prepared. 39
In Lopez, the Court, in a decision authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, ruled
that the Federal Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1994140 was unconstitutional
because it exceeded the scope of Congress's authority to act pursuant to the
Commerce Clause."" Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that Congress may regulate
the use of the channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of com-
merce, or persons or things in commerce, "even though the threat may come only
from intrastate activities."' 42 The government unsuccessfully argued that posses-
sion of a gun near a school might lead to violent crime, which would disrupt edu-
cation, and that education is necessary for the nation's economic productivity.'
The Court held that the relationship to commerce was too tenuous."' Lopez's
reach has proven to be fairly limited,"" given the obviously sparse relationship
between possession of a firearm and the "commerce" of education. Indeed, the
Court, in Printz/Mack, did not look to the limits on the Commerce Clause;
instead, the plurality opinion was based upon the fact that the Brady Act "com-
pelled" state officials to act.
The Court's opinion in Printz/Mack was consistent with prior decisions, most
notably New York v. United States,4" that have applied the Tenth Amendment to
preclude, even in instances in which the power of Congress to regulate com-
136. 437 U.S. at 621-23 and 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
137. Professor Gerald Gunther concluded that while "[t]here's a tremendous amount of preposterous hulla-
baloo about how the federal government is being restricted," the "idea that the Brady Bill's downfall suggests a
return to the pre-New Deal court, with its rigid limits on federal power, is nonsense." NAT'L L.J., July 14, 1997,
at A26.
138. No. 95-1478 (June 27, 1997).
139. Id.
140. Pub. L. No. 103-382, Title 1, § 101 (1994).




145. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 E3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (upholding con-
stitutionality of Endangered Species Act, noting that the biodiversity of species affects interstate commerce).
146. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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merce is properly utilized, measures that actively compel state and local offi-
cials-as opposed to private parties, or governments and government officials as
well as private parties-to take affirmative measures. Nothing about a discontin-
uation of a flow control measure "compels" a local official to take steps in the
nature of the enforceable requirements contained in the Brady Act. With regard
to such affirmative responsibilities, both the New York and Garcia Courts found
that there is no affirmative limitation on the reach of the Commerce Clause cre-
ated by the Tenth Amendment when both government and the private sector are
equally regulated.147 That distinction remains true today; indeed, it supports the
imposition of a variety of federal environmental, health and safety, and business
regulatory laws in the face of the Tenth Amendment. Those laws may condition
federal finding upon the creation and state-enforcement of federally-delegated
programs, but they do not "compel" states or, as in Printz/Mack, "the State's offi-
cers directly" 1" to act.
Litigation regarding flow control measures has not generated serious Tenth
Amendment defenses to date. The Printz/Mack ruling should hardly encourage
courts to uphold a flow control requirement on the basis that to require the dis-
continuance of a discriminatory measure would somehow be to "compel" local
officials to act in an area traditionally left to state or local superintendence.
Moreover, the opinion of the district court in Oehrleins and the Supreme
Court's decision in Carbone provided an independent justification for a finding
that the "as enforced" Hennepin County, Minnesota ordinance violated the
Commerce Clause: the County operated to exclude all but the favored operator
from the business of conducting a waste management disposal or incineration
service within the County for the receipt of locally generated waste, thus depriv-
ing other in-state and out-of-state businesses from access to the marketplace.
The Eighth Circuit incorrectly contended that the ordinance, as enforced, tolerat-
ed the participation of out-of-state processors who may receive wastes delivered
to their distant facilities."4 9 No other provider of waste management services
could, after constructing a facility within Hennepin County, hope to receive any
county-generated waste. Such restrictions on direct access to markets contravene
the Commerce Clause.1
50
147. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
148. New York, 505 U.S. at 166 ("compel"); Print v. United States/Mack v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 2365,
2384 (1997) ("in the State's officers directly").
149. Yet,
the designated facilities need not compete with any other facilities in the state of Minnesota. This
gives them a monopoly over any waste that for any variety of reasons will not or cannot be trans-
ported out-of-state. With this secure base of waste supply, the designated facility has the economic
power to compete more aggressively with out-of-state facilities for the segment of the market poten-
tially available for out-of-state disposal. Additionally, the waste industry is highly location sensitive.
Out-of-state interests cannot neutralize the designated sites' locational advantage by siting facilities
in Minnesota in or near Hennepin County, because [the flow control ordinance] forbids any such
competing facilities from receiving Hennepin County waste.
Ben Oehrleins & Sons and Daughter, Inc. v. Hennepin County, petition for writ of certiorari, supra note 9, at 23.
150. See SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown, 66 F3d 502 (2d Cir. 1995); Heir's Trucking, Inc. v. Waupaca
County, 569 N.W.2d 353 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). Accordingly, so-called "intrastate" flow control requirements
insulate local waste collection or disposal markets from interstate commerce by barring from the local markets
those out-of-state competitors who wish to enter that marketplace with the installation or operation of an in-
market facility.
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Jurisdictions that seek to implement "intrastate" flow control requirements
would ostensibly not attempt to argue that EPA national regulations governing
solid waste landfills and incinerators do not apply to facilities that, due to flow
control requirements or otherwise, accept only in-county or in-state generated
wastes. Yet, the Eighth Circuit's ruling threatens to create a standard under the
"dormant" Commerce Clause that simply would not be tolerated in the case of
opposition to a federally-imposed program.
A Commerce Clause philosophy that recognizes, exclusively for purposes of
the "dormant" aspect of the Clause, that flow control requirements imposed by
political subdivisions of a state which are not "border" counties are permissible,
while those imposed by jurisdictions that are "close" to a state line are not,
makes little practical or legal sense.15 It would mean that the citizens of Toledo,
for example, could benefit from the Commerce Clause, while inhabitants of
Columbus may not. It would foster the establishment or retention of a balka-
nized solid waste system--one that reluctantly acknowledges the inability to
restrict the export of waste to other states, but that emphatically controls and
restrains the movement of wastes between political subdivisions of the state. The
aggregate effect of such measures would substantially affect interstate com-
merce. Like the flow control measures invalidated because they restricted the
export of wastes from counties, rather than states, such "bifurcated" ordinances
isolate counties from the statewide, regional (intrastate), and national market-
places in waste disposal. Obviously, if every county or municipality adopted a
similar requirement, waste disposal would, without question, become balkanized.
151. It should be noted that state law may serve as the basis for invalidation of "intrastate" flow control ordi-
nances. For example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that a municipal by-law that prohibit-
ed the removal of waste materials from the town was "an unreasonable, and therefore excessive, exercise of the
power the Legislature has conferred on municipalities...." Beard v. Town of Salisbury, 392 N.E.2d 832, 834
(Mass. 1979). In Beard, the municipality adopted a by-law that provided that "no person who is an inhabitant
of the town or noninhabitant of the town, company or corporation shall remove sand, loam, or gravel from land
not in public use out of the confines of the Town of Salisbury, Mass." Id. at 834. The court concluded that the
by-law lacked any basis in the home rule amendment of the Massachusetts Constitution, noting that the provi-
sion could not be construed to allow a municipality to regulate or prohibit inter-municipal traffic and thereby
bar the movement of persons, vehicles, or property beyond its boundaries. Id. at 836. (emphasis added).
Indeed, the Massachusetts courts have squarely condemned efforts by municipalities to restrict the free flow of
intrastate commerce by adopting much the same free trade rationale advanced by courts construing the federal
Commerce Clause. In George P Davy, Inc. v. Town of Norton, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 190 (1974), the Appeals Court
examined a by-law that provided that "to protect the public health, safety, convenience, and welfare of the com-
munity and recognizing that loam, soil, clay, sand and stone are an ever increasingly precious commodity, the
Town of Norton prohibits the transporting of any of the above listed outside the limits of the Town." Id. at 192.
The court remanded the case to the lower court for further factual determinations. In doing so, it did not hesi-
tate to declare its opposition to by-laws that seek to restrict the intrastate transportation of commodities. It
noted that, "[i]f by-laws such as the amendment in this case should proliferate from town to town, the
Commonwealth could become effectively balkanized." Id. at 196. Similarly, California courts have held that
local ordinances that ban the import or export of waste are arbitrary and improper exercises of the "police
power." See, e.g., Ex Parte Lyons, 80 P.2d 745 (1938).
An "ultra vires" claim might also be pursued in those jurisdictions, such as Missouri, that adhere to the stan-
dard referred to as "Dillon's Rule." See, e.g., Comment, The Dillon Rule - A Limit on Local Government
Powers, 41 Mo. L. REv. 546 (1976). Put simply, Dillon's Rule permits a municipality to exercise only those
powers that are expressly granted to it by the state or which are necessarily implied or essential to the function-
ing of state government. See generally 1 J. Dillon, Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations ii (5th
ed. 1911); James E. Westbrook, Municipal Home Rule: An Evaluation of the Missouri Experience, 33 Mo. L.
RaV. 45 (1968).
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Only a small percentage of generated waste would be managed in a truly national
marketplace.
Likewise, the harmful effects upon the national economy that would result
from judicially-sanctioned importation bans aimed at competitors within the
same state justify a determination that "intrastate" flow control ordinances are
subject to invalidation pursuant to the "virtually per se" Commerce Clause stan-
dard. Imagine, for example, the counterproductive impacts if Houston, Texas
prohibited the importation of personal computers manufactured in Austin. The
city of Austin would undoubtedly institute a similar ban of its own to protect its
local manufacturers. Companies deprived of market access would be harmed
economically, as would purchasers of computers. These concerns are what
prompted the development of the Commerce Clause and have led the courts to
invalidate a number of state and local measures that threaten to interfere with the
national economy.
All political subdivisions of all of the states of our Union depend upon open
borders and a national economy that imposes both benefits and burdens. The
Commerce Clause serves to ensure that those borders remain open and that they
not be closed to some commodities, but open for others. Local governments
engage in few, if any, efforts to preclude the importation of seemingly desirable
foodstuffs, manufactured goods, service equipment, etc., or the export of other
locally-produced goods for sale elsewhere. However, for purely or predominant-
ly economic reasons, they may seek to prohibit the export of a single commodi-
ty-waste.
The post-Carbone efforts to retain existing flow control mandates and pro-
grams and to impose new ones, despite the Supreme Court's ruling, are reminis-
cent of other regrettable episodes in our nation's history. "Intrastate" flow con-
trol ordinances would have the undesirable effect of provoking political subdivi-
sions of states to engage in an unnecessary and counterproductive war of retalia-
tion, as jurisdictions whose economies are disadvantaged, due to the loss of
imported waste volumes, act in kind by precluding the export of their wastes.
Very real safety and health threats would result from continued reliance upon
older, often substandard, disposal sites. Both goals of the Congress in enacting
RCRA and of the EPA in promulgating the Subtitle D rules would be ill-served.
Just as prohibitions on the movement of waste across state lines adversely
affect the national economy by isolating local jurisdictions from the burdens,
though not the benefits, inherent in a single Union, so, too, do restrictions on the
movement of waste between political subdivisions of a single state balkanize the
marketplace. They affect-indeed, substantially so-the national marketplace by
artificially distinguishing between "waste" materials and the open borders that
facilitated the transportation, importation, purchase, and consumption of the
"original" materials. They deprive companies, as well as governments, who con-
struct or expand state-of-the-art facilities of the ability to make meaningful long-
term investments in disposal capacity and transportation vehicles. They disrupt
regional intergovernmental efforts to improve the efficiency and environmental
protectiveness of waste disposal. They artificially and dramatically increase the
costs of solid waste management. Perhaps most importantly, they constitute
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deliberate efforts to circumvent the goals of the Commerce Clause and the
Supreme Court's numerous opinions. Application of the Commerce Clause to
invalidate such measures is necessary to ensure that the Clause's vital role in pro-
tecting a truly national economy is not diminished.
A number of courts have ruled that a variety of state and local actions that were
intended to or actually resulted in restrictions on the importation of waste violate
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Outright bans, differen-
tial fees and taxes, onerous financial assurance requirements, referenda on per-
mitting limitations based upon the amount and nature of recycling programs in
the exporting community, restrictions on the intrastate movement of waste, so-
called "reciprocity" requirements, transportation fees, volume or capacity caps
or ceilings, prohibitions on private ownership or operation of facilities, excessive
or unnecessary registration fees, backhauling restrictions, vehicle sticker stan-
dards, additional permitting requirements, increased state or local inspections,
"demonstration of need" mandates, permit denials based upon local opposition to
imported waste, and mandatory waste sampling and manifesting standards are
among the numerous state and local measures that have been invalidated by
courts pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
The leading Supreme Court decisions make clear that certain state and local
actions, even if they do not expressly discriminate against out-of-state interests,
may nevertheless be as greatly disfavored as those that do. The Supreme Court
strongly opposes state and local laws and regulations that promote "isolationism"
just as vigorously as it disfavors discriminatory activity. Indeed, the Court has
routinely emphasized that of all the limits on non-federal activity, "none is more
certain than the prohibition against attempts on the part of any single State to
isolate itself from difficulties common to all by restraining the transportation of
persons and property across its borders.""1 2 While it is easy to oversimplify
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it bears noting that virtually every challenged
action that evidences "protectionism," "isolationist" intent or purpose, or which
expressly or in practical effect discriminates against commerce violates the
Clause. Moreover, the courts have not hesitated to invalidate local, purportedly
intrastate, restrictions on the basis that waste is inherently a commodity in pro-
tected, hence "interstate," commerce and in light of the fact that seemingly local
actions can multiply and "balkanize" commerce throughout the Nation.
Although Congress has, in accordance with the Commerce Clause, so-called
"plenary" authority over interstate commerce, rarely has federal legislation
sought to legalize state and local activities that discriminate against commerce.
Congress may exercise its authority to restrict otherwise protected commerce
without the need of a constitutional amendment, even if the legislation overturns,
in whole or in part, a Supreme Court decision. However, previous examples of
congressional intervention to overturn judicial rulings regarding the Commerce
Clause are few in number and typically deal with rather extreme situations. For
example, the Mann Act was enacted in order to address the "importation" of
152. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1941).
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women for nefarious purposes."5 3 The Webb-Kenyon Act was enacted in 1913 to
allow states to regulate the importation of liquor."' The Federal Power Act
authorized states to assert regulatory authority over the use of water in the gener-
ation of electricity.155
Moreover, the Supreme Court has made clear that discriminatory actions are
not immune from the reach of the Commerce Clause unless Congress has
"expressly stated" its intentions that non-federal activity be free from Commerce
Clause-based review. The Court noted, in South-Central Timber Development v.
Wunnicke, that "there is no talismanic significance to the phrase 'expressly stat-
ed'; however, it merely states one way of meeting the requirement that for a state
regulation to be removed from the reach of the dormant (i.e., judicially-created)
Commerce Clause, congressional intent must be unmistakably clear."'5 6
Accordingly, while Congress can authorize states and localities to engage in
activity that is contrary to the Commerce Clause, the scope of the "immunity" is
only as large as the specific language used by Congress. For example, the Court
has held that mere statements of policy or federal objectives cannot protect a
state statute from Commerce Clause review. Federal "savings" provisions, which
broadly vest regulatory authority over certain subjects upon state governments,
have not defeated the Commerce Clause. No court has accepted the premise that
either RCRA or CERCLA, as currently worded, provides any congressional sup-
port for state or local importation restrictions.
Congress has not enacted a bill that would purport to "restore" flow control
authority to jurisdictions that possessed it for the benefit of particular indebted
facilities, and the odds of passage of such legislation have been substantially
reduced as a result of adjustments made by local governments to market condi-
tions. Even actions that are arguably consistent with local government "police
powers" could remain subject to invalidation pursuant to the Commerce Clause,
in the event of federal legislation. Assume, for example, that Congress passes
legislation authorizing local governments to reinstate certain flow control provi-
sions that were in effect prior to the date of the decision in Carbone, to the extent
of indebtedness incurred prior to the ruling. The response of a local government
would be to prohibit the private ownership of waste disposal facilities. The local
legislation would remain subject to the Commerce Clause for several reasons.
The federal law would not expressly authorize the local legislation. The mea-
sure would not be eligible for an "exemption" to the Commerce Clause applica-
ble to simple "market participants" because the objective and effect of the law
would be to destroy competition, rather than simply foster governmental partici-
pation in the waste disposal industry. No private entity could, by mere decree,
abolish any opportunity for competitors to operate within a particular jurisdic-
153. See Hoke and Economides v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding constitutionality
of the Act). For a historical discussion with a modem application, see Michael Conant, Federalism, the
Mann Act, and the Imperative to Decriminalize Prostitution, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (1996)
(www.cls.cornell.edu/cjlpp/vol5n2/conant.htm).
154. 27 U.S.C. § 122.
155. 16 U.S.C.A. § 791a.
156. 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984).
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tion. Likewise, it is likely that the law would have been motivated by an inten-
tion to preclude the ability of other facility owners to accept wastes generated
within the area.
Taking the hypothetical further, assume that the state or local law or regulation
is squarely within the confines of any enacted federal statute and a release from
potential Commerce Clause-related liability has been unambiguously provided
by Congress. Does any federal or state constitutional or statutory provision exist
that would likely result in judicial invalidation of the provision? The answer is
yes, and the fact that federal legislation would not constitute automatic freedom
from the reach of other federal and, potentially, state laws makes clear the need
for careful review of whether congressional action is warranted at all.
Congress is authorized to immunize, to the extent that it specifically does so,
state and local measures from the Commerce Clause. But, Congress may not
"protect" discriminatory activities from other federal constitutional provisions.
As the Congressional Research Service noted, "in striking contrast, there appears
to be no basis for inferring a similar power of congressional immunization in
connection with equal protection, due process, or impairment of contract chal-
lenges to state legislation."1"7
Plaintiffs, in lawsuits challenging restrictions on waste movement (either re-
strictions on the import of waste or, in the case of flow control requirements, on
waste export), have, in virtually every instance, relied exclusively upon the
Commerce Clause. The litigants have referred-usually with success-to the
extensive catalog of decisions interpreting the Clause. A mere handful of plain-
tiffs have referenced other constitutional rights or guarantees in their pleadings,
and even fewer have briefed the issues to any degree. Courts have acted pursuant
to the Commerce Clause. The enactment of federal legislation that makes more
difficult or circumvents Commerce Clause claims is likely to spur a second gen-
eration of litigation based, in large measure, upon other federal constitutional
provisions. Likewise, even in the absence of federal legislation passed pursuant
to the Commerce Clause, flow control requirements and programs, such as those
described elsewhere in this Article, would be subject to invalidation on federal
constitutional grounds.
For example, the Supreme Court has long held that a state or local statute, ordi-
nance, or regulation may not, pursuant to the Contracts Clause found in Article I,
Section 10 of the Constitution, impair "the obligations of Contracts."' Accord-
ingly, the Court has held that a statute cannot effectively prohibit or impair the
implementation of a contract in existence at the time of passage of the require-
ment." 9 Although the Court has held that the "prohibition against impairing the
157. Congressional Research Service, Report to Congress, State and Local Discrimination Against Import
of Solid Waste: Constitutional Issues, Feb. 22, 1990, at 21. See also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S.
408 (1946); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW 525 (2d ed. 1988).
158. See, e.g., Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819); Jonathan B. Baker, Has the Contract Clause
Counter-Revolution Halted? Rhetoric, Rights and Markets in Constitutional Analysis, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
71 (1984); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, State Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Contract Clause, 57 U.
CrN. L. REV. 611 (1988).
159. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
1998)
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
obligation of contracts is not to be read literally,"'60 when a state or local require-
ment encourages or results in a "substantial impairment of a contractual relation-
ship," ' the impairment must be both necessary and reasonably designed to pro-
mote a valid public purpose.
16 2
Courts, in flow control decisions based upon the Commerce Clause, have fre-
quently concluded that the challenged measure was not "necessary" in light of
the fact that there are invariably other, less discriminatory, methods to accom-
plish seemingly legitimate goals relating to the protection of human health and
the environment. State and local bans or restrictions on importation or exporta-
tion would likely seriously impair existing contractual obligations-for example,
contracts between the landfill operator and out-of-state generators, between the
operator and waste haulers, and between the operator and the local community
("host agreements"). The importance of avoiding the impairment of contracts
entered into in accordance with state law and otherwise valid has, for example,
prompted most supporters of federal interstate waste importation legislation to
specifically endorse protections for previously executed host community agree-
ments.
A 1996 decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court demonstrates the contem-
porary value of the Contracts Clause. In Empire Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v.
Pennsylvania, the court held that Lehigh County's flow control program violated
both the Commerce Clause and the Contracts Clause in that it precluded the
plaintiff from performing the terms of a contract entered into before the flow
control requirement became effective.163
Similarly, the purpose of the Privileges and Immunities Clause is to protect cit-
izens from interstate discrimination.'64 As the Supreme Court observed as early
as 1870,
the Clause plainly and unmistakably secures and protects the right of a citizen of
one State to pass into any other State of the Union for the purpose of engaging
in lawful commerce, trade, or business without molestation; to acquire personal
property; to take and hold real estate; to maintain actions in the courts of the
State; and to be exempt from any higher taxes or excises than are imposed by
the State upon its own citizens.
16
1
160. Id. at 1249.
161. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Sparmaus, Attorney General of Minn., 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978).
162. Energy Reserve Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411 (1983); United States Trust
Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 28-32 (1977).
163. aff'g, 645 A.2d 413 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).
164. See, e.g., Lundinget v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, No. 96-1462 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1998) (striking
down New York statute that denied nonresident taxpayers a state income tax deduction for alimony payments;
Court reasoned that Clause does not permit states to categorically deny personal deductions to nonresident tax-
payers in the absence of a substantial justification for the difference in treatment).
165. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. 418, 430 (1870).
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Without the Clause,16 the Court has observed, "the Republic would have consti-
tuted little more than a League of States; it would not have constituted the Union
which now exists.'
16 7
The Clause has been applied to invalidate state or local actions that discrimi-
nate16 ' against out-of-state entities. 169  It applies to any activity or right that
"[bears] upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity."1  The Court "repeat-
edly has found that 'one of the privileges which the Clause guarantees to citizens
of State A is that of doing business in State B on terms of substantial equality
with the citizens of the State. '" 71  Accordingly, the Court has distinguished
between state discriminatory activity that relates, for example, to admission to
public universities and laws or actions that promote economic protectionism.
1 72
Under the Clause, discrimination against residents of another state is justified
only when there is a "substantial reason for the difference in treatment."'"7 In a
celebrated decision, the Court invalidated a South Carolina law that imposed a
tax on out-of-state shrimpers, noting that the Clause prohibits "discrimination
against citizens of other States where there is no substantial reason for the dis-
crimination except for the mere fact that they are citizens of other States."' 74
State and local waste importation and flow control restrictions are, by their very
nature, efforts to discriminate solely on the basis of the origin of the waste,176 and
courts have routinely concluded that no "substantial reason" for differential treat-
ment of out-of-state waste exists. Although the Privileges and Immunities
Clause focuses on the economic factor, rather than the commodity, the result
should be the same.
The Supreme Court has held that the Clause is not available to corporations;1 76
however, that position has been severely criticized by commentators, 17 7 and it is
likely merely a matter of time before corporate rights are acknowledged as well.
In the meantime, individuals who are adversely affected by state or local import
restrictions-who, for example, face job losses or displacements because of the
inability to transport waste to facilities they serviced--could likely maintain a
claim.
166. The Supreme Court has noted that protected privileges and immunities include "all of the privileges of
trade and commerce which were protected in the fourth Article of the Articles of Confederation." Baldwin v.
Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 394 (1978). See also Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and
the Commerce Clause, 3 CONST. COMM. 395 (1986).
167. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868).
168. David S. Bogen, The Privileges and Immunities Clause ofArticle IV, 37 CASE W RES. L. REv. 794 (1987).
169. See, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, Comm'r, Dept. of Labor of Alaska, 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
170. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 383.
171. Supreme Court of N. H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 280 (1985).
172. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
173. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 222 (1984). See also
Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship " and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 487 (1981).
174. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948).
175. The Court, in Toomer, observed that the Clause prohibits "discrimination against citizens of other
States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination except for the mere fact that they are citizens
of other States." Id. at 396. The Court rejected the defense of state ownership, noting that the argument was "a
fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and reg-
ulate the exploitation of an important resource." Id. at 402.
176. Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 535 (1928).
177. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Shane V Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional
Balance of Federalism, 1987 DuKE L.J. 569, 610-11 (1987) ("From a policy perspective there can be little doubt
that corporations should receive the protections of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.").
178. U.S. CoNsT., Amend. XIV, § 1.
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II. THE ROLE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
IN ADDRESSING FLOW CONTROL REQUIREMENTS
The Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution'78 serves a valuable pur-
pose-to prohibit classifications by governments of similarly situated individuals
and entities. Over the years, the Clause has been employed by courts to strike
down laws that discriminate on the basis of race or gender. Zoning laws that dis-
tinguish between residential occupants on the basis of disability, transportation
restrictions that exempt certain parties, taxes on certain publications, tax exemp-
tions, regulatory programs that apply exclusively to for-profit or "commercial"
entities, civil service preferences, and residency-based programs and restrictions
are among the numerous state and local laws and activities that have been invali-
dated pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause. More recently, the Supreme
Court struck down a state constitutional provision that created a distinction on
the basis of sexual preference.179 The Clause is, moreover, hardly limited to dis-
crimination against individuals or groups of persons. Corporations and business
entities are protected by the Clause as well.
A. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward: The Equal Protection Clause
as a Substitute for the Commerce Clause
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, the Supreme Court used the Equal
Protection Clause to invalidate an Alabama law that taxed out-of-state insurance
companies at a higher rate than in-state entities.8 The Commerce Clause was
not applicable in light of the McCarran-Ferguson Act,181 which overturned a 1944
Supreme Court decision'82 by broadly providing that states could regulate the
activities of insurers. The federal statute provided that
[t]he business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject
to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such
business. No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or super-
sede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance. 8
Armed with the Act, Alabama argued that its legislation, which assessed a
three-to four-percent levy on the gross premiums charged by out-of-state insurers
while imposing a mere one percent charge on in-state companies," ' was protect-
ed by the Constitution. It acknowledged that the tax scheme had a greater impact
upon "foreign" insurers, but asserted that the legislation helped to promote the
179. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
180. 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
181. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15.
182. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). See also Western & S. Life
Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 653 (1981).
183. 470 U.S. at 869.
184. Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a) (1975). See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Forrester, 437 So. 2d 535 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1983).
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growth of an in-state insurance industry and that increased investment in Ala-
bama companies by its residents was a worthy and entirely legitimate goal.'85
The State ridiculed the plaintiff's Equal Protection claim, opining that it was
nothing more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric in equal protection clothing.""18
The lower courts ruled in favor of the State.
187
The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion written by Justice Powell and joined
in by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens, overruled
the lower court opinion and invalidated the tax-on the basis that the discrimina-
tory measure, while truly immune from the Commerce Clause due to the federal
statute, nonetheless violated the Equal Protection Clause. 88 Justice Powell
observed that "Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is purely and com-
pletely discriminatory, designed only to favor domestic industry within the State,
no matter what the cost to foreign corporations also seeking to do business
there."'89 Moreover, he observed that the legislation was enacted for a discrimi-
natory, protectionist purpose, declaring that the law constituted. "the very sort of
parochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to pre-
vent."' 0
Although the Court acknowledged that the "interest in preserving local institu-
tions responsive to local concerns was a cornerstone in Alabama's defense of its
insurance tax,"' 9 it observed that "promotion of domestic business within a
State, by discriminating against foreign corporations that wish to compete by
doing business there, is not a legitimate state purpose." '192 The majority of the
Court reasoned that the Clause "forbids a State to discriminate in favor of its own
residents solely by burdening the residents of other state members of our [nation-
al] federation."' 93 Alabama's tax, the Court concluded, was "purely and com-
pletely discriminatory."' 
4
In its ruling, the Court emphatically denied the proposition that the McCarran-
Ferguson Act had any effect upon non-Commerce Clause claims. 95 Although the
Court stated that it was not employing Commerce Clause reasoning in invalidat-
ing the Alabama tax, it did, indeed, utilize a standard of review quite consistent
with the language employed by courts, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, in
evaluating laws that evidence protectionist intent or motivation.'98 Justice Powell
observed that the effect of the statute was to place the primary tax burden on out-
of-state insurers, thus incidentally imposing a restriction on interstate com-
merce.
97
185. 470 U.S. at 869, 875 n.5.
186. Id. at 880 (quoting brief for appellee Ward 22).
187. 437 So. 2d at 535; 447 So. 2d 142 (Ala. 1983).
188. 470 U.S. at 882.
189. Id. at 869.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 880.
193. Id. at 878.
194. Id.
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Alabama's argument that the Court was simply equating Commerce Clause and
Equal Protection doctrine was rejected on the basis that a "per se" standard that
validated state discriminatory measures was not appropriate and that the State's
justifications for the tax were not legitimate.'98 The fact that Congress had acted
to "authorize" the State's action was, the Court concluded, irrelevant for Equal
Protection Clause purposes. 99 It noted that "[e]qual protection restraints are
applicable even though the effect of discrimination [in this case] is similar to the
type of burden with which the Commerce Clause [is] concerned.""2 ' Similarly,
the Court recognized that to validate discriminatory measures on the basis of
Federal legislation would mean that "any discriminatory tax would be valid if the
State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit domestic business." ''
One commentator subsequently observed that the Court's ruling means that
courts "can use the equal protection clause to forbid discrimination affecting inter-
state commerce, even when Congress has sought unequivocally to protect such dis-
crimination from attacks based on the commerce clause."20 2 The Court's utilization
of Commerce Clause-like references and conclusions was neither surprising nor
incorrect given the fact that both constitutional provisions are based on notions of
fair play and non-discrimination. At the same time, the Court's reasoning was
quite consistent with prior, and subsequent, Equal Protection decisions.
The passage of time has not diminished the importance of the Court's ruling.203
In a number of decisions in the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts employed an "intermediate" level of scrutiny of measures that affected
important individual and economic interests. More recently, the Court returned
to the so-called "rational basis with bite" approach utilized in those opinions
invalidating a Colorado constitutional provision that prohibited local gay-rights
ordinances. The recent increased emphasis upon Equal Protection claims and the
endorsement of a more rigorous standard of review makes even more likely the
possibility that state and local measures that seek to restrict waste movement may
not survive judicial review.
Philip Weinberg of St. John's University has correctly observed that Metro-
politan Life makes virtually certain judicial invalidation of laws that restrict
waste movement. 20  Indeed, flow control requirements-through the type of
ordinance invalidated in Carbone or by methods such as franchises/municipal
contracts, economic flow control, and "intrastate" ordinances-present precisely
the type of concerns that prompted the Court to invalidate the Alabama differen-
198. Id. at 878-83.
199. Id. at 880.
200. Id. at 870.
201. Id. at 882.
202. Note, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward: Equal Protection Activism, 37 ALA. L. REv. 483, 494
(1986).
203. See Kirsten Engel, Reconsidering the National Market in Solid Waste: Trade-Offs in Equity, Efficieny,
Environmental Protection, and State Autonomy, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1481, 1501 n.101 (1995).
204. John H. Turner, Off to a Good Start: The RCRA Subtitle D Program for Municipal Solid Waste Land-
fills, 15 TEMP. ENVIL. L. & TECH. J. 1, 46-48 (1996).
205. Philip Weinberg, Congress, The Courts, and Solid Waste Transport: Good Fences Don t Always Make
Good Neighbors, 25 ENVrL. L. 57 (1995).
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tial insurance tax. Significantly, the Court, in Metropolitan Life, employed the
least-rigorous standard for review under the Equal Protection Clause: the tradi-
tional "rational basis" test. 206 Indeed, the insurers who challenged the Alabama
legislation did not contest the proposition that a rational relation existed. 27
However, the Court's recent opinion in Romer v. Evans suggests that courts may
apply a more rigorous standard of rational basis review than was applicable when
Metropolitan Life was decided. 208
B. Romer v. Evans: A Return to "Rational Basis with Bite" Scrutiny
One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that the
Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Unheeded
then, those words now are understood to state a commitment to the law's neu-
trality where the rights of persons are at stake. The Equal Protection Clause
enforces this principle .... 209
With these words, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, began the majority opinion in Romer v. Evans.
20
The Court invalidated a Colorado constitutional provision which preempted any
ordinances enacted by political subdivisions that sought to prohibit "discrimina-
tion on the basis of 'homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, prac-
tices, or relationships. ' ' 2" Not surprisingly, the Court's decision was greeted
with applause by human rights organizations 2 2 and with derision by others .
2
13
Romer is, to many, a victory for fundamental fairness and common sense. Some
Commentators have suggested that the majority opinion is rich in emotion and
rhetoric, but short on reasoning. 214 It would, however, be a mistake to classify
Romer as a narrow "politically correct" aberration or to suggest that the Court
206. 470 U.S. at 875.
207. Id. at 873.
208. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
209. Id. at 1623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (dissenting opinion)). The Equal
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that "(n)o state shall.., deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
210. Id. Romer has not been the subject of extensive commentary. Leading constitutional law treatises have
tended to marginalize its impact. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, Louis M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN &
MARK V TusHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 64 (3d ed., 1996 Supp.). One commentator classified the decision
under the category "consensual sodomy." RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 87 (4th ed.,
1996 Supp.); RONALD L. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 18.2 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1997). See Marc A. Fajer, Bowers v. Hardwick, Romer v. Evans, and
the Meaning ofAnti-Discrimination Legislation, NAT. J. SEX. ORIENT. L., Vol. 3.1 (http:sunsite.unc.edu/gaylaw/
issue4).
211. Id. (citing COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b).
212. See, e.g., A Battle, Not the War, NEWSWEEK, June 3, 1996, at 25 (quoting Elizabeth Birch, Executive
Director of the Human Rights Campaign, as stating that "I thought of Thurgood Marshall and all of the civil-
rights lawyers who struggled to achieve Brown v. Board of Education."); Court: 'Animus' in Colo. Gay Law,
NAT'L L.J., June 3, 1996, at A11.
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, supra note 212, at 30
(The majority opinion of Justice Anthony Kennedy - a Reagan appointee - is emotional and
grand. He opened with a quote from Justice Marshall Harlan's impassioned dissent 100 years ago in
Plessy v. Ferguson, the infamous ruling upholding 'separate but equal' for blacks and whites ....
The problem is that Kennedy's opinion reads more like a political manifesto than a piece of judicial
reasoning. Americans have faith in the Supreme Court because they believe it is neutral, something
more than the gut feeling of nine well-connected lawyers.).
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did not intend to espouse generally applicable principles for equal protection
jurisprudence. Indeed, as others have noted, "in the long run, Romer v. Evans
may do as much to restrict government as to help homosexuals." '215
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Romer is the Court's willingness to
emphatically reject, using the most deferential standard of review under the
Equal Protection Clause-the so-called "rational basis test," purportedly non-dis-
criminatory justifications offered by governmental defendants."21 Historically,
the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have emphasized that "a state classi-
fication scheme that does not rely on suspect or 'quasi-suspect' classifications
and does not infringe upon fundamental rights" '217 is subject to a deferential
"rational basis" review. When the rational basis standard is applicable, the activ-
ity in question satisfies the Equal Protection Clause if it "is neither capricious
nor arbitrary, and rests upon some reasonable consideration of difference or poli-
cy. '218 Moreover, in several decisions, the Court has held, in the words of the
Tenth Circuit, that "[i]t is well settled that economic and social legislation gener-
ally is presumed valid."
' 219
Traditionally, except in instances in which the governmental classification
infringes upon a fundamental right 221 or a "suspect" or "semi-suspect" class,
221
courts have merely sought to determine whether the governmental activity "bears
a rational relationship to legitimate legislative goals. ' 222 The "standard of review
is typically quite deferential; legislative classifications are 'presumed to be
valid,' largely for the reason that the 'drawing lines that create distinctions is
peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one.'"223
Rational basis review has been considered as prohibiting "the judiciary
sit[ting] as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative
215. Homosexuals: A Victory for Rationality, THE ECONOMIST, May 25, 1996, at 30.
216. For an example of how the reasoning used in Romer might be used to address the constitutionality of a
provision in the Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996 regarding denial of disability benefits for
drug addicts and alcoholics, see Nicole Fiocco, Note, The Unpopular Disabled: Drug Addicts and Alcoholics
Lose Benefits, 49 ADMrN. L. REv. 1007, 1022-27 (1997).
217. Mary LaFrance, Constitutional Implications ofAcquisition-Value Real Property Taxation: The Elusive
Rational Basis, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 817, 829-833 (1994).
218. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 344 (1989).
219. Oklahoma Educ. Ass'n v. Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Comm'n, 889 E2d 929, 932 (10th
Cir. 1989). See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993); United States R.R. Retirement Bd.
v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). In Beach Communications,
the Court "stated that a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes funda-
mental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably con-
ceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." 508 U.S. at 313. Annotation,
Government Regulation of Telecommunications as Violating Equal Protection Under Federal Constitution -
Supreme Court Cases, 124 L. Ed. 2d 703, 712. See also G. Sidney Buchanan, A Very Rational Court, 30 Hous.
L. REv. 1509 (1993).
220. Such as the right to travel and to vote, see, e.g., Dunn, Governor of Tenn. v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972); Shapiro, Comm'r of Welfare of Cinn. v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
221. Note, Melanie E. Myers, Impermissible Purposes and the Equal Protection Clause, 86 COLUM. L. REv.
1184 (1986).
222. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 53-54 (1977). See also Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
223. Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S. 360, 370 (1988) (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)); Williamson, Attorney General of Okla. v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S.
483 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
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policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor
proceed along suspect lines."22 ' Indeed, as Justice Marshall once noted, previous
courts did not hesitate to "dream up rational bases.""22 It is thus not surprising
that commentators have largely agreed that rational basis review authorizes
courts to act as "little more than lunacy commissions."226  Increased reliance
upon state constitutional provisions seemed to be the only way to ensure that
claims involving economic impacts and non-suspect classifications would be
scrutinized with any degree of rigor. 227 Romer may have the impact of elevating
equal protection analysis228 and could have a significant impact upon environ-
mental laws and regulations-as well as non-environmental measures, such as
flow control requirements-which differentiate between otherwise similarly situ-
ated groups.
The Romer Court, to the delight of many opponents of the Colorado provision
(who had, assuming that non-suspect class review would not be helpful to their
cause, urged the Court to apply a more exacting standard), 229 invalidated the
measure by applying the rational basis test. 220 While the majority had no need to
determine whether homosexuals comprise a suspect or semi-suspect class, the
Justices did not hesitate to reject every purportedly "rational" defense proffered
by the State and the dissenting Justices. 21 The degree of judicial independence
224. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (quoting City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303
(1976)).
225. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
226. Aman, Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the
Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 1101, 1129-30 & n.135 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked
Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REy. 1689, 1696-1698 (1984) ("The Supreme Court demands
only the weakest link between a public value and the measure in question, and it is sometimes willing to
hypothesize legitimate ends not realistically attributable to the enacting legislature.").
227. See, e.g., Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND.
L. REV. 100 (1995); Ann L. Iijima, Minnesota Equal Protection in the Third Millennium: "Old Formulations"
or "New Articulations "?, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 337 (1994); Michael Lester Berry Jr., Equal Protection -
The Louisiana Experience in Departing From Generally Accepted Federal Analysis, 49 LA. L. REy. 903 (1989);
Robert F Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1195 (1985); Note,
Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1324 (1982);
Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in Public School Finance Reform
Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639 (1989).
228. Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6, 55 (1996) ("If [tradition-
al] rationality review is the appropriate standard, Amendment 2 seems constitutional, as an effort either to dis-
courage the social legitimization of homosexuality or to conserve scarce enforcement resources and protect
associational privacy.").
229. For pre-Romer evaluations of the need and desirability of a finding that laws that discriminate against
homosexuals are deserving of high or intermediate-level scrutiny, see Baggert, Constitutional Law - Suspect
Class Status and Equal Access to the Political Process Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment- Laws Precluding Anti-Discrimination Legislation for Homosexuals, 63 TENN. L. REv. 239 (1995);
Chrisman, Evans v. Romer: An "Old" Right Comes Out, 72 DEN. U. L. REv. 519 (1995); Stephen Zamansky,
Colorado's Amendment 2 and Homosexuals'Right to Equal Protection of the Law, 35 B.C. L. REv. 221 (1993);
Renee Culverhouse & Christine Lewis, Homosexuality as a Suspect Class, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 205 (1993).
230. But see Larry Alexander, Sometimes Better Boring and Correct: Romer v. Evans As an Exercise of
Ordinary Equal Protection Analysis, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 335, 345
(What is remarkable about Romer is the absence of any discussion of the standard of review. Justice
Scalia, in his dissent, argued that rational basis review was surely the proper standard. He went on
to surmise that the majority agreed with him on that point. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion,
however, nowhere expressly mentions the standard of review that it is employing, though it implies
that it is rational basis review that Amendment 2 fails.).
231. Timothy M. Tymkovich, John Daniel Dailey & Peter Farley, A Tale of Three Theories: Reason and
Prejudice in the Battle Over Amendment 2, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 287, 327 (1997) ("[T]he trial record compre-
hensively developed a number of legitimate governmental purposes, any one of which satisfied the Court's tra-
ditional 'any conceivable basis' review under rational basis.").
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demonstrated by the Court and its unwillingness to accept, as dispositive, any
"non-crazy" justification for the governmental classification is striking. 232
Romer is, therefore, not simply a victory for gay rights advocates-it is an
unequivocal and triumphant return to the "rational basis with bite" approach233
that briefly surfaced in the early 1980s and had its high-water mark with the
Court's 1985 opinion in City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center.234
In several opinions issued during the 1980s, the Court applied the rational
basis test to invalidate state and local classifications with economic impacts.23s
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, the Court applied the Equal
Protection Clause to invalidate an Alabama statute that imposed a differential tax
on out-of-state insurance companies, although the tax did not implicate strict
scrutiny review.23 The Court rejected the State's assertions that the tax provided
a needed source of income and that other non-discriminatory reasons justified
the levy.237 Likewise, the Court struck down an Alaska program that sought to
allocate income from mining on the basis of duration of residency,2" a tax on
automobiles that were purchased in another jurisdiction,29 a tax exemption for
certain veterans of the Vietnam conflict,2 0 and civil service benefits that were
preferentially distributed to veterans. 241
In Cleburne, the Court rejected a zoning determination that denied a special
use permit to the operator of a proposed group home for the handicapped. In
these cases, the Court, while applying rational basis scrutiny, either repudiated or
ignored the justifications advanced (whether concocted before or subsequent to
the action in question) and utilized what some commentators termed "rational
basis with bite" review. 242  Several post-Cleburne decisions by lower federal
232. See generally Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and Democracy's Domain, 50 VAND. L. REv. 361, 380-
81(1997).
233. See Caren G. Dubnoff, Romer v. Evans: A Legal and PoliticalAnalysis, 15 LAw & INEQ. J. 275, 304-05
(1997) ("However, while the Court in deciding Romer did not conform to the most deferential type of rational
basis analysis, the approach it took was not without precedent .... [S]everal other cases have found violations
of the Equal Protection Clause while purporting to use the rational basis test."); Lynn A. Baker, The Missing
Pages of the Majority Opinion in Romer v. Evans, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 387, 406 (1997) ("And in so holding, the
Court surely startled those who have come erroneously to believe that the 'rational basis' requirement of equal
protection doctrine imposes a constraint that is minimal in theory but nonexistent in fact.").
234. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
235. See, e.g., Note, Jennie S. Stinebaugh, Constitutional Law - Heller v. Doe: The Rational Basis
Guessing Game, 25 U. MEM. L. RE. 329 (1994).
236. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
237. Id. at 1682-84.
238. Zobel v. Williams, Comm'r of Revenue of Alaska, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
239. Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985).
240. Hooper v. Bemalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985).
241. Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
242. See, e.g., Mauro, Commercial Speech After Posadas and Fox: A Rational Basis Wolf in Intermediate
Sheep's Clothing, 66 TuL. L. REv. 1931 (1992); Pamela J. Tabari, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term Equal
Protection and Rational Basis Analysis, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 235 (1992); Gayle Wynn Pettinga, Rational
Basis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny By Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987); Note, Ellen E. Hallow, A
Changing Equal Protection Standard? The Supreme Court 's Application of a Heightened Rational Basis Test in
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 20 LoY. LA. L. RE. 921 (1987); Note, Nancy M. Reininger, City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center: Rational Basis With a Bite?, 20 U.S.F L. REv. 927 (1986).
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courts likewise demonstrated that judges would purposefully review governmen-
tal classifications and reach independent determinations of their reasonableness
and effectiveness. 
2 43
Shortly thereafter, however, the "new" rational basis standard turned out to be
mostly bark. In a series of decisions, culminating in the 1993 decisions in Heller
v. Doe244 and FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.,24 the Supreme Court, while
never rejecting the rationale of the Cleburne line or the notion of "rational basis
with bite," seemed to roll back the equal protection carpet. In Heller, the Court
declared that "a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and
may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical
data." '246 In Beach Communications, the Court ignored the existence of First
Amendment concerns, in a case involving the regulation of satellite antenna sys-
tems, by holding that
equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or
logic of legislative choices. In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory
classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamen-
tal constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenges if
there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational
basis for the classification.247
Both courts made clear that economic classifications-i.e., those state and
local actions that had primarily a fiscal impact-should, in the absence of a fun-
damental right or suspect group involvement, be reviewed through the rational
basis approach. Several lower courts signaled their dissatisfaction with indepen-
dent judicial review by noting, in the words of the Seventh Circuit, that a deter-
mination is not irrational even if it is "opposed by argument and opinion of seri-
ous strength."24
Environmental laws and regulations have traditionally been reviewed pursuant
to the highly deferential standard of rational basis review. For example, in
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Shinn, a federal district court rejected an allegation that
the pursuit of a site remediation mandate by the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection was improper. 249 The plaintiff unsuccessfully argued
that the Equal Protection Clause was transgressed because the Department's
decision to pursue remediation was based largely upon the apparent ability of the
defendant to pay for the cleanup, rather than the actual extent of contamination
as compared to other sites. 250 The court emphasized that "[w]hile environmental
243. See, e.g., Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, 811 F.2d 171 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987); Phan
v. Commonwealth of Va., 806 F.2d 516 (4th Cir. 1986); Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983 (D. Kan. 1985);
Oklahoma Broadcasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 636 E Supp. 978 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
244. 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
245. 508 U.S. 307 (1993).
246. 509 U.S. at 320.
247. 508 U.S. at 313.
248. Northside Sanitary Landfill v. Indianapolis, 902 F.2d 521, 523 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing Rast v. Van
Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 357 (1916)). See also Familystyle of St. Paul v. City of St. Paul, 923 F.2d
91 (8th Cir. 1991).
249. 877 E Supp. 921 (D.N.J. 1995).
250. Id.
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cleanup should to some extent be based on the level of environmental contamina-
tion at a site, it may be based on other factors as well. The Equal Protection
Clause does not require the government to regulate at a level of 'mathematical
nicety.""'2 1 The rational basis test has been applied in other "selective enforce-
ment" contexts to justify prosecutorial discretion.2"2 Facial challenges to state
and local environmental laws and regulations have typically met with the same
fate.2"3 These decisions, whether pre or post-Cleburne, have largely accepted any
articulated justification, no matter how seemingly fanciful or ad hoc, for the clas-
sification in question.
The Romer majority had the opportunity, as the dissenting opinion contended,
to seize upon any number of seemingly "rational" justifications for the Colorado
provision. 24 Justice Scalia, in yet another "vigorous" dissent, chastised the
majority for issuing a decision that was "so long on emotive utterance and so
short on relevant legal citation.""25 He accused the majority of not recognizing
that, even with the provision, "general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary
discrimination" would continue to protect homosexuals under state, if not feder-
al, law. 256 Moreover, the effect of the provision was limiting, according to Justice
Scalia, in that homosexuals would merely be prohibited from obtaining preferen-
tial treatment. 2 7 He found it "obvious" that one or more rational justifications
supported the provision."
Not surprisingly, the dissent placed considerable emphasis upon the not-yet-
overturned 1986 decision of the Court, in Bowers v. Hardwick,"' which held, in
Justice Scalia's words, "that the Constitution does not prohibit what virtually all
States had done from the founding of the Republic until very recent years-mak-
ing homosexual conduct a crime. That holding is unassailable, except by those
who think that the Constitution changes to suit current fashions."2 ' Accordingly,
"[i]f it is constitutionally permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct
criminal, surely it is constitutionally permissible for a State to enact other laws
merely disfavoring homosexual conduct.""2 1 The unwillingness of the majority
251. Id. (citing Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)). The court also referred to
Hameetman v. City of Chicago, 776 E2d 636 (7th Cir. 1985), in which the Seventh Circuit opined that "[t]he
Constitution does not require states to enforce their laws ... with Prussian thoroughness as the price of being
allowed to enforce them at all .... Selective, incomplete enforcement of the law is the norm in this country."
252. See, e.g., Texas v. Malone Serv. Co., 829 S.W.2d 763 (Tex.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 974 (1992);
Department of Envt'l Prot. v. Lewis, 522 A.2d 485 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); City of Peekskill v.
Williams, 507 N.YS.2d 730 (1986); Medusa Corp. v. Commonwealth Dep't of Env. Res., 415 A.2d 105, 110
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1980); Frame Factory, Inc. v. Dept. of Ecology, 583 P.2d 660 (1978).
253. Examples include Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981), which involved the
constitutionality of a Minnesota law governing the sale of non-recycled plastic containers.
254. See generally Joseph Jackson, Sauce for the Goose: Some Thoughts on Gay Sex and Equal Protection,
48 FLA. L. REv. 473 (1996).
255. 517 U.S. 620, 639 (1996).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See, e.g., Stacy Sulman Kahana, Crossing the Border of Plenary Power: The Viability of an Equal
Protection Challenge to Title IVof the Welfare Law, 39 Aiuz. L. REV. 1421 (1997); S.I. Strong, Romer v. Evans
and the Permissibility of Morality Legislation, 39 ARIz. L. REv. 1259 (1997).
259. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
260. 517 U.S. at 640-41.
261. Id. at 641.
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to validate a state constitutional provision-which was enacted by a majority
vote of the electorate-in the face of seemingly "rational" justifications amply
demonstrates that the Court has returned to the "rational basis with bite"
approach. 262 It is too early to detect whether, and to what extent, lower courts
will again be willing to chew on articulated justifications and engage in the type
of scrutiny employed by the Romer majority.2"3 But, there is little justification
for the notion that the reasoning employed by the majority should somehow be
restricted to cases in which a "right" to petition the government is arguably
involved-particularly since the majority did not hold that any fundamental right
was infringed by the constitutional provision.
C. An Example ofApplication of the Revitalized "Rational Basis with Bite"
Standard to an Environmental Issue: The Case of the Unsuccessful Effort to
Extend or Delete, on Behalf of a Limited Class of Solid Waste Landfill Operators,
North Carolina 's Unlined Landfill Closure Rule
Arguably, there are a number of environmental laws and regulations that could,
either on their face or as applied, be subject to rigorous equal protection review
pursuant to the Romer standard. Flow control requirements are instituted for
economic, not environmental, reasons and, accordingly, are not appropriately
characterized as "environmental" provisions. But, a brief examination of a con-
troversy that involved environmental provisions also illustrates how the "rational
basis with bite" test can be utilized to invalidate flow control mandates.
262. Two subsequent decisions of the Court, Washington v. Glucksburg, No. 96-110 (U.S. June 26, 1997)
and Vacco v. Quill, No. 95-1858 (U.S. June 26, 1997), did nothing to limit the potential scope of Romer Vacco's
holding was quite narrow: the New York law prohibiting physician-assisted suicide did not result in the creation
of two similarly situated, but differently treated, parties. The reasoning of the Court in Glucksburg involved
application of the Due Process Clause to a facial challenge of a state ban. The Court denied certiori in Equality
Found of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 E3d 289 (6th Cit. 1997), cert. denied, No. 97-1795
(U.S. Oct. 14, 1998), with regard to a Cincinnati charter provision similar to the Colorado measure, but with the
unusual step of three justices (Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg) noting that the "actual meaning of the Cincinnati
amendment was sufficiently ambiguous, and sufficiently different from the Colorado amendment struck down
in Romer v. Evans, as to make the case a poor vehicle for Supreme Court decision." Justices Leave Intact Anti-
Gay Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1998, at A17. The opinion made clear that, at least in the view of the three
Justices, the denial of certiorari did not reflect on the Court's views about the underlying issues.
Likewise, the per curiam ruling in Central State Univ. v. American Assoc. of Univ. Prof Central State Univ.
Chapter, No. 98-1071 (Mar. 22, 1999), reversing a decision of the Ohio Supreme Court, likely fails to question
the relevance of Romer. An Ohio state law obligates public universities to create teaching workload standards
and exempts those requirements from collective bargaining. The purpose of the statute was to create an appro-
priate balance between teaching and research activities. Citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) and FC.C. v.
Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993), the Court concluded that an exemption from collective bar-
gaining was, in fact, the most direct means of accomplishing the legislature's intention.
263. But see, as examples of decisions issued pursuant to either the Federal or state constitutions' guarantees
of equal protection, Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Co. v. Chittenden Solid Waste Dist., 27 ELR 21144 (D. Vt. Apr.
3, 1997) (condemnation of land by municipal solid waste district may constitute violation of right to equal pro-
tection); College Area Renters and Landlord Assoc. v. City of San Diego, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 515 (Cal. App. 1996)
(local ordinance designed to restrict number of residents of nonowner-occupied dwellings did not have a ratio-
nal relationship to a legitimate governmental interest); Longview of St. Joseph, Inc. v. City of St. Joseph, 918
S.W2d 364 (Mo. App. 1996) (argument that locality discriminated against waste haulers constituted cause of
action for equal protection violation); Gas N' Shop, Inc. v. City of Kearney, 539 N.W2d 423 (Neb. 1995) (zon-
ing ordinance that distinguished between businesses that sold liquor and those that did not violates Equal
Protection Clause).
264. H.B. 1359; S.B. 1277 (1996 Short session of N.C. General Assembly).
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Bills2. 4 filed in the 1996 "short session" of the North Carolina General
Assembly would have, for a select group of public landfill operators, rolled back
a long-established deadline of 1998 for the closure of unlined municipal solid
waste landfills."26 In early 1991, the North Carolina Commission for Health
Services promulgated, pursuant to public notice and comment, regulations that
sought to implement the federal municipal solid waste landfill criteria.266 The
regulations included a requirement that all unlined landfills close by 1998.267
Since the adoption of the closure deadline, "87 of the state's 100 counties have
complied with the new regulations by closing their old landfills... [s]ome coun-
ties have built new, lined landfills; many others have skipped the expense and are
now shipping garbage to private landfills .... "28 During the 1995 session of the
Legislature, several communities, led by the City of Greensboro, unsuccessfully
sought the passage of an amendment that would remove the 1998 deadline.
Those communities sought to continue to rely upon their unlined landfills for the
disposal of municipal solid waste.
The 1995 effort met with considerable opposition from municipalities and
counties that had moved toward the utilization of environmentally protective
facilities, environmental groups, the private solid waste collection and disposal
industry, and the media. As the Chairman of the House Health and Environment
Committee noted, "[t]here is no excuse for not meeting a requirement with that
much advance notice." '269 And, as observed by the County Manager of Pearson
County, North Carolina-which constructed a transfer station to accommodate
the movement of waste to a lined facility-"[c]hanging the deadline now would
penalize all of us who acted in good faith and complied to reward a few counties
that ducked their responsibility.""27 The Raleigh News & Observer editorialized
that "the proposal would send a signal that environmental rules aren't for keeps
and that if those affected delay long enough, they may be able to bend the regula-
tors their way. If North Carolina expects its regulations to be followed, it needs
to stick with them.
271
The proponents of a delay of the deadline also sought a revision in the regula-
tion, which was unanimously rejected by the Commission for Health Services.
The Department of Environment, Health and Natural Resources opposed any
extension of the closure deadline and testified in opposition to a change in state
law to accommodate an extension. Still, the newly-formed Joint Legislative Ad-
265. As 1998 began, the vast majority of counties had come into compliance. But see Caldwell Breaks
Landfill Rule, CHARLOrrE OBSERVER, Jan. 2, 1998, at 2C; State Grants Caldwell Use of Landfill Until April 1,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Jan. 13, 1998, at 3C.
266. 40 C.ER. Part 258.
267. 15A NCAC 13B.1627(c) (10A). The State has required the installation of liners at new landfills since
1987.
268. Panel to Recommend New Landfill Deadline: Unlined Sites May Get 5-Year Reprieve, WINSTON-SALEM
J., May 10, 1996, at B1.
269. Hearing on Landfill Proposal, WEEKLY INDEPENDENT (Rural Hall, N.C.), Sept. 26, 1996, at 2.
270. Id.
271. Editorial, The Rule is the Rule, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, July 23, 1995.
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ministrative Procedure Oversight Committee voted to recommend that the 1996
General Assembly extend the lifespan of unlined landfills through 2003 in the
absence of any review of potential future environmental impact and with mini-
mal restrictions, regardless of whether or not groundwater at the sites was cur-
rently contaminated.
The bills constituted a means to facilitate the avoidance of the EPA liner crite-
rion. They would have allowed unlined landfills to vertically expand, thus excus-
ing them from the need to "trigger" the 40 C.ER. Part 258 liner requirement,272
by laterally expanding or creating new disposal "units" (or, if such expansion
cannot be physically or cost-effectively accommodated, closing). Yet, the federal
courts have consistently held that states may not employ such exemption or vari-
ance approaches to circumvent the imposition of federal minimum requirements.273
Of equal importance, the purported environmental and economic justifications
for the extension were no more "rational" than the assertions reviewed and
rejected by the Court in Romer.
There was, quite simply, only one apparent justification for the bills-to lessen
the fiscal impact upon certain counties. That goal, however, even if otherwise
justified, arguably cannot alone support a determination that private and comply-
ing public facilities must adhere to a different, more rigorous standard. Indeed,
such distinctions in the regulatory standards are arguably precisely the type of
government action that is prohibited under the Equal Protection Clause. A fur-
ther examination of the justifications proffered by proponents of the bills demon-
strated their weakness. Existing environmental problems would have been exac-
erbated, rather than contained (much less, as some proponents have suggested,
minimized). The bills would have provided that, at the expiration of the exten-
sion period, the landfill operator would install a waterproof cap, but it was also
undisputed that, with regard to an unlined facility, greater capacity means poten-
tially greater risk. Adding solid waste to an unlined landfill after 1998 would
likely increase the toxicity of its leachate, and the use of a waterproof cap would
not have substantially reduced the amount of leachate produced by the facility
over a thirty-year period. In addition, for every year that an unlined facility
accepts waste, the potential for groundwater contamination is extended by eight
to ten years."27
However, the bills were not as restrictive as a regulatory proposal unsuccessful-
ly advanced in 1995. The 1995 proposal would have required local governments
to implement a "program" that would have "reduced the amount of waste," but
the proposal failed to identify the amount of reduction necessary to satisfy the
regulation (is a cubic yard of "reduction" sufficient?). Moreover, the proposal
272. Described in 40 C.ER. § 258.40. See generally John H. Turner, Solid Waste Regulation Under RCRA, 9
NAT. REs. & ENV'T 6 (1994); Note, The New Federal Standards for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills: Adding
Fuel to the Regulatory Fire, 3 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 383 (1992).
273. Train, Adm'r E.P.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975); Citizens for a
Better Environment v. EPA, 596 E2d 720 (7th Cir. 1979).
274. A 1995 study of Greensboro's unlined landfill concluded that if an unlined landfill the size of the City's
stayed open until 2006, the amount of BOD produced at the landfill would increase by 175% more than if it had
closed in 1998.
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did not describe what it means to have "implemented" a program. Likewise, it
failed to articulate a standard for determining the period in which waste reduc-
tion or recycling occurred. Indeed, the proposal was internally inconsistent: the
first sentence of the proposal suggested that any reduction or recycling of waste
is sufficient, regardless of where the waste might otherwise have been disposed,
while the second sentence stated that the program must have decreased the
amount of waste disposed of in the "unit."
The proposal would have apparently tolerated Department approval of any
"amended transition plan" submission that "demonstrated" any amount of reduc-
tion in solid waste disposal volumes. Accordingly, counties that showed, for
example, a twenty-five percent reduction from year-to-year would arguably have
been treated the same as counties that had a one-ounce reduction. In light of the
amorphous criteria for evaluating precisely whether a "decrease in the amount
disposed of in the MSWLF unit" is actually attributable to the reduction/recy-
cling "program" and the inconsistency in wording between the first and second
sentences of the subsection, it appeared that the mere existence of a program
would likely have been sufficient. Moreover, the time frame within which the
comparison must occur was not specified. Would, for example, a slight decrease
due to a program introduced, but not necessarily made permanent, shortly before
the date of submission of the plan for a vertical expansion be sufficient? There
was clearly no environmental or policy justification for allowing vertical expan-
sions at landfills simply because some de minimus quantity of waste has alleged-
ly been diverted from the facility pursuant to a "program."
Similarly, the proposal failed to establish a requirement that a recycling "pro-
gram" be maintained, much less improved upon, during the period of operation
of the landfill. It suggested that a permittee could "demonstrate" the existence
of a "program" through a de minimis amount of recycling in order to secure
approval to vertically expand the landfill, then either abandon the program or fail
to accomplish an increase in recycling percentages or volumes after approval. 27
It would make little sense to condition approval of vertical expansions of land-
fills upon the existence, before application, of a recycling program without mak-
ing certain that the program not only continues, but accomplishes steady increas-
es in the percentage of waste that is recycled.
In addition, the proposal failed to set forth any meaningful way for the
Department to supervise, during the period of operation, the satisfactory accom-
plishment of the criteria set forth in the proposal pursuant to the extension. For
example, the proposal would not have prohibited the acceptance of household
hazardous wastes at affected landfills-a simple "diversion" program would
have been satisfactory. Yet, if real diversion is an important means of ensuring
that vertical expansions do not adversely impact the environment, enforceable
disposal prohibitions should have been considered.
275. Terminology used in one of the 1995 bills.
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These deficiencies did not simply demonstrate the shortcomings of the 1995
proposal. The 1996 bills were, remarkably, far less restrictive than even the orig-
inal proposed regulatory amendment. They would not have required a compre-
hensive recycling program-instead, a mere household hazardous waste collec-
tion program, with a minimum of once a month collection (curbside collection
would not have been mandated), would have been sufficient.
Romer v. Evans may signal the return of "rational basis with bite" review.
Accordingly, a number of environmental laws and regulations-particularly
those that provide exemptions or different standards for facilities largely or clear-
ly on the basis of ownership-could be subject to judicial invalidation. The
unsuccessful North Carolina bills, for example, sought nothing more than a
"class variance" for a small group of operators that had sought to avoid the
implications of the 1998 closure deadline and then sought a reward for that delay.
That class of operators could not point to a legitimate environmental or, ultimate-
ly, cost justification for their proposal. The bills were, therefore, an example of
the type of environmental standard that could, after Romer, be subject to
increased judicial scrutiny pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause.
Likewise, non-environmental measures that affect the movement of solid waste
between political subdivisions of the same state or between states-flow control
requirements and importation restrictions-should be subject to intensive scruti-
ny in light of the reasoning employed by the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life
and Romer. As courts reviewing Commerce Clause claims have consistently
noted, there are numerous non-discriminatory alternatives to flow control mea-
sures and waste importation restrictions. Prohibitions on the export or import of
waste serve no legitimate environmental justification. Flow control requirements
increase the costs of waste collection by as much as forty percent. Jurisdictions
that have abandoned flow control have enjoyed dramatic reductions in the prices
charged to homeowners and businesses: reductions of twenty to fifty percent are
not uncommon. Flow control measures create monopolies that hinder job cre-
ation and hurt business growth and development. Flow control represents a hid-
den tax burden by artificially inflating the costs of waste collection and disposal.
Also, flow control requirements impose significant "unfunded mandates" upon
local governments.
III. SELECTIVE PROSECUTION DEFENSE-EQUAL PROTECTION PRINCIPLES
Flow control measures are, by their very nature, subject to abuse. Few have
been diligently and consistently enforced.276 Accordingly, firms that abide by the
measure may suffer competitive harm when competitors violate the local provi-
sion. Similarly, selective enforcement claims assert that a constitutional right has
been transgressed through the prosecution of an individual or entity on an
improper ground, such as race, national origin, corporate size, or other relevant
276. See, e.g., NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 5, 1992, at BI (quoting a regional director of the New York Depart-
ment of Environmental Conservation: "You literally have to get into a car and follow a garbage truck around.").
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factor. A number of defendants in criminal proceedings have sought the dis-
missal of their indictments on equal protection grounds. More recently, parties
in environmental regulatory matters have also advanced the defense, likewise
premising their claims on constitutional grounds. Courts have traditionally
imposed considerable burdens on plaintiffs in selective enforcement lawsuits.
Parties in noncriminal adjudications have had some success in advancing equal
protection arguments. The ruling of the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Armstrong, while directly affecting selective prosecution arguments
based upon the racial identity of defendants in federal "crack cocaine" cases,
may serve to increase the evidentiary burden placed upon parties in civil and
criminal environmental enforcement proceedings who claim they have been sin-
gled out for an invidious, bad faith, or otherwise impermissible reason.27
A. The Traditional Approach
Selective prosecution arguments derive from the Supreme Court's 1886 opin-
ion in Yick Wo v. Hopkins."27 There, the Court evaluated a San Francisco ordi-
nance that restricted the operation of laundries in wooden buildings. The licens-
ing process authorized by the ordinance resulted in the approval of non-Chinese
applicants, but the denial of applications from laundry operators of Chinese
descent."'8 The Court reasoned that, although the ordinance was not facially dis-
criminatory, the disparity in application of the provision was impermissible and
violative of the Equal Protection Clause.280 Yick Wo has been cited by the Court
in numerous subsequent decisions dealing with matters as disparate as jury selec-
tion criteria,281 state statutes, 282 and the administration of statutes. 2
Several courts have also relied on Yick Wo for the proposition that the unequal
enforcement of a criminal statute or selective prosecution constitutes a depriva-
tion of the guarantee of equal protection. 284 These courts have based the argu-
ment that selective prosecution is impermissible on the basis of the Yick Wo
Court's statement that "[tlhough the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil
eye and an unequal hand.., the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibi-
tion of the Constitution.
281
277. 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
278. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). See Note, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61
COLUM. L. REv. 1103 (1961).
279. 118 U.S. at 356.
280. Id.
281. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
282. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Kotch v. Board of River Pilot Comm'rs, 330
U.S. 552 (1947); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
283. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Edu. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Washington, Mayor of Washington
D.C. v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
284. United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.
1972); United States v. Robinson, 311 F Supp. 1063 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
285. 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
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B. Threshold of Proof
A majority of the pre-Armstrong courts established a relatively high threshold
of proof for defendants who assert selective prosecution claims. For example,
courts routinely held that evidence of discriminatory purpose could not be
inferred merely from statistical or circumstantial evidence of disparate impact.286
These courts reasoned that evidence of actual discriminatory intent was required
in Yick Wo. In several decisions, however, courts appeared willing to accept dis-
parate impact evidence.
In United States v. Steele, for example, Selective Service protestors, seeking to
avoid answering questions of the United States Bureau of the Census, argued that
they were prosecuted because of their prior participation in antiwar activities. 287
They offered evidence that at least one-half-dozen other violators, one of whom
was a well-known critic of the Vietnam conflict, were known to prosecutors. 2"
Only vocal opponents of the use of the Census for Selective Service purposes,
they asserted, had been presented for indictment. The Ninth Circuit agreed that a
discriminatory purpose could be inferred from the evidence and that the govern-
ment was, accordingly, required to demonstrate the absence of selective prosecu-
tion. 289 Steele was joined by several other decisions involving purported distinc-
tions between vocal antiwar protestors and others, including United States v.
Crowthers"' and United States v. Falk.
291
C. Statistical Evidence insufficient
The Supreme Court's 1985 opinion in United States v. Wayte concluded that
statistical evidence was, alone, insufficient.282 The Court rejected the argument
that discriminatory purpose could be inferred from the fact that draft require-
ments had been enforced solely against antiwar protestors. It reasoned that the
evidence did not demonstrate either that the government intended a discriminato-
ry policy or that the defendants had been singled out exclusively because of their
political involvement. 293
Since Wayte, defendants have largely placed emphasis on the requirements for
obtaining discovery of documentation and oral evidence from government offi-
cials in order to demonstrate discriminatory purpose. Several pre-Armstrong
286. For an analysis of the proposition that purposeful discrimination will not typically be inferred from sta-
tistical evidence, see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
287. 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. 456 F.2d 1074, 1078 (4th Cir. 1972).
291. 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc).
292. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
293. The Court observed that "[d]iscriminatory purpose ... implies more than ... intent as awareness of
consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least
in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Id. at 610 (quoting
Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)); see Note, Crucified by the FCC? Howard
Stern, the FCC, and Selective Prosecution, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 203, 222 (1995).
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federal courts concluded that defendants should be authorized to conduct discov-
ery. But, despite the urging of commentators to the contrary,"' lower courts
have insisted that defendants demonstrate both discriminatory effect and purpose
as prerequisites to an evidentiary hearing.29"
Likewise, state courts were not sympathetic to selective enforcement argu-
ments. Courts rejected unlawful discrimination claims in the context of prosecu-
tions for prostitution,297 assault,2 98 vehicular homicide,299 fire codes, 300 extor-
tion," 1 ticket scalping, 2 issuing worthless checks,0 ' thefts detected through
"decoy" operations," 4 and narcotics distribution involving a paid informer."0
The state decisions largely followed the analysis set forth in Wayte by placing
particular attention on judicial deference to charging decisions and the constitu-
tional role of the prosecutor in criminal proceedings." 6
D. Pre-Armstrong Claims Regarding Environmental Enforcement
Several defendants have raised the defense of selective enforcement in environ-
mental civil and criminal enforcement proceedings. Such claims have, until
recently, been uniformly dismissed. Typical of the courts' responses is the rea-
soning of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in Medusa Corp. v. Common-
wealth Department of Environmental Resources."7 There, an owner of a cement
kiln contested the imposition of civil penalties assessed on the basis of purported
air pollution violations. Citing Yick Wo, Medusa alleged that it was a "victim of
discriminatory enforcement," which led to "a denial of equal protection rights." '
294. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538, 1539-40 (1 1th Cir. 1987), vacated in part, 836 E2d
1312 (1 1th Cir. 1988); Taylor v. United States, 798 E2d 271, 274 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 933
(1987); United States v. Mitchell, 778 F.2d 1271, 1272 (7th Cir. 1985).
295. See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, Equal Protection and the Prosecutors Charging Decision: Enforcing an
Ideal, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 659, 667 (1981); Daniel J. Givelber, The Application of Equal Protection
Principles to Selective Enforcement of the Criminal Law, 1973 U. ILL. L.E 88, 97 (1973); Note, And Justice for
All: Wayte v. United States and the Defense of Selective Prosecution, 64 N.C. L. REv. 385 (1986).
296. See, e.g., Government of Virgin Is. v. Harrigan, 791 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1986).
297. Commonwealth v. King, 372 N.E.2d 196 (Mass. 1977) (defendants argued that male customers were
not targets of enforcement).
298. People v. Carter, 450 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1982).
299. Wisconsin v. Barman, 515 N.W2d 493 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (black defendants argued that white par-
ticipants in nightclub fistfight were not arrested; court concluded that defendants engaged in "more culpable"
conduct, including use of farm instruments as weapons).
300. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 486 N.Y.S.2d 124 (1984).
301. New Jersey v. Savoie, 320 A.2d 164 (1974).
302. New York v. Salmon, 478 N.Y.S.2d 780 (1984).
303. Locklear v. State, 86 Wis.2d 603 (Wis. 1979).
304. Minnesota v. Woodard, 378 N.W2d 32 (1985).
305. Iowa v. Apt, 244 N.W2d 801 (Ia. 1976).
306. In Wayte, the Court noted that "[s]uch factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general
deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's over-
all enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake."
470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). Moreover, "[e]xamining the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding,
threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's motives and decisionmaking to outside
inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government's enforcement policy." Id.
307. 415 A.2d 105, 110 (Pa. Commw. 1980).
308. Id. at 109.
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The court summarized Medusa's defense and then summarily rejected it.309 The
court declined to indicate what type of evidence would demonstrate that a defen-
dant had been "wrongly singled out.
310
A paucity of reasoning also affects the opinion of a New Jersey court in
Department of Environmental Protection v. Lewis. 11 While the court devoted
considerable attention to the lower court's views as to an appropriate penalty, it
devoted only one sentence in the text and one in a footnote to the defendant's
arbitrary enforcement claim.312 The court merely noted that "[t]he [trial] judge
rejected, as being without merit, Lewis' contention that the environmental laws
were being selectively and arbitrarily enforced against him. 313
Courts have, similarly, frequently denied efforts to obtain proof of unequal
enforcement through discovery. In City of Peekskill v. Williams, the court reject-
ed a defendant's contention that it should have been permitted to further its claim
through written interrogatories." 4 The dilemma for defendants is, of course, that
claims of selective enforcement can rarely be seriously advanced without some
evidence of discriminatory purpose, yet courts are reluctant to permit the gather-
ing of evidence through the discovery process.
Several courts have, however, demonstrated a receptivity to equal protection-
based selective enforcement claims. In Frame Factory, Inc. v. Department of
Ecology, the Washington Court of Appeals rejected the defense, but only after
determining that the agency's administrative efforts were, roughly, equal.1 In
Malone Service Co. v. Texas, the Texas Court of Appeals concluded that while a
defendant claiming discriminatory enforcement "carries a heavy burden," the
defendant should be able to offer evidence in support of the argument.3 16 Malone
had been ordered by the Texas Water Commission in 1979 to discontinue the use
of an "earthen pit" for hazardous waste disposal. However, the pumping of
sludge into the pit continued in a covert manner. At trial, Malone offered a selec-
tive prosecution defense that attempted to show that the enforcement proceeding
was actually motivated by the Commission's desire to benefit a quasi-govern-
309. The court noted that:
[a]s a basis for showing discriminatory enforcement, Medusa points to: DER's resistance to
Medusa's discovery requests before the EHB, on which the EHB never ruled; DER's concentration
on observation and testing of Medusa's plant, with little or no testing as to the other fifteen cement
plants in the Commonwealth; DER's failure to file complaints against other cement companies,
despite evidence submitted by Medusa in the EHB hearing (primarily by aerial photo) that other
cement plants were emitting visible plumes from their stacks. We must agree with the EHB that
such evidence does not suggest the "discriminatory design" in which a finding of unequal enforce-
ment is to be based. As pointed out by the [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court,... an enforcement pro-




311. 522 A.2d 485 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
312. Id.
313. 522 A.2d at 489. The court added that "[w]e likewise reject these contentions as without merit." Id. at
n.4.
314. 507 N.Y.S.2d 730, 731-32 (1986).
315. 583 P.2d 660, 664 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
316. 804 S.W2d 174 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 829 S.W2d 763 (Tex. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 974
(1992).
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mental competitor, the Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority.317 The court reversed
and remanded the judgement of the trial court.318 On appeal, the Texas Supreme
Court, in a vigorously worded opinion, rejected the appeals court's reasoning. 19
In contrast, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that a defendant in an environ-
mental enforcement proceeding would be "entitled to dismissal of prosecution as
a matter of law" if the defendant "sustains the burden of establishing intentional
or purposeful discrimination based upon an unjustifiable standard .... ."'
Although the court found that the plaintiff had failed to "present a distinct pat-
tern of selective enforcement"--several other open burners had been subject to
similar proceedings, it observed that "important societal interests" are served by
selective prosecution claims, given that
[a]buse of th[e] prosecutorial power to harass unpopular political groups or oth-
erwise to intimidate persons unjustly presents a serious danger to society. The
defense of discriminatory enforcement is the only means provided defendants to
ensure that enforcement of the criminal law is not premised upon bias, preju-
dice, or other improper motives. 2
Pre-Armstrong federal courts only occasionally entertained selective prosecu-
tion claims involving environmental infractions. In United States v. Walsh, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's claim that the United
States EPA had engaged in a discriminatory pattern of enforcement activity. 22
Likewise, a district court concluded that the EPA's efforts to secure recovery of
remediation costs pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) did not evidence selective enforce-
ment. 23 It suggested, however, that claims could be advanced in both civil and
criminal proceedings. 24
The pre-Armstrong environmental enforcement decisions left open the ques-
tion of whether courts should be more or less willing to second-guess environ-
mental enforcement decision-making in civil proceedings. The concurring opin-
ion of the Texas Supreme Court in Malone argued that "a state agency's need for
discretion in regulatory enforcement is even more compelling than that required
in a criminal context. 3 21 Moreover, Justice Gonzalez contended that "the role of
317. 804 S.W2d at 176.
318. Id. at 174.
319. 829 S.W2d at 768. In a concurring opinion, Justice Gonzalez opined that
[w]ithout proof of discriminatory intent, the fact that violators have received different penalties is
probative of nothing other than the truism that different tribunals (judges or juries) respond differ-
ently to similar facts because of factors completely unrelated to the prosecutor's motives. These fac-
tors include: (1) the strength or weakness of the facts of the case; (2) the experience, wisdom, and
advocacy skills of the lawyers on both sides of the case; and (3) the differences among community
values and attitudes. For example, a tribunal may be more strict on a polluter in their back yard
while being more tolerant of a polluter in your back yard.
Id. at 768-69.
320. Hawaii v. Kailua Auto Wreckers, Inc., 615 P.2d 730 (Haw. 1980).
321. Id. at 735.
322. 8 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 1993), affd, 511 U.S. 1081 (1994).
323. United States v. Pretty Prods., 780 E Supp. 1488 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
324. Id. at 1501 n.17.
325. 829 S.W2d 763, 769 (Tex. 1992).
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a jury in a state civil enforcement action is distinguishable from a federal crimi-
nal prosecution, and that at some point in a civil action it is desirable to have a
jury decide issues of fact concerning the defense.""32 Several commentators sug-
gested that prosecutors should be granted considerable discretion, while civil
enforcement agents should be granted less discretion. 27 Others, noting that civil
penalties may, in many instances, be relatively severe, contend that both civil and
criminal enforcement proceedings should be subject to liberal judicial inquiry in
the event of possible enforcement bias. 2s
The pre-Armstrong decisions involving civil and criminal enforcement of envi-
ronmental requirements were, accordingly, consistent with the opinions pertain-
ing to a variety of other types of allegations. Put simply, the courts have evi-
denced a general unwillingness to entertain selective enforcement claims in the
absence of evidence of both discriminatory purpose and effect. They have either
failed to address the issue of whether discovery could be utilized to gather neces-
sary evidence or have suggested that discovery might be appropriate. The ques-
tion of whether courts should allow discovery of prosecutors to advance a selec-
tive enforcement claim-and, incidentally, the standard for demonstrating a
prima facie case of discrimination-was before the Court in Armstrong.
E. United States v. Armstrong
The defendants in Armstrong argued that they were selected for federal prose-
cution on the basis of their race.329 They noted that the mandatory penalties for
the possession and distribution of crack cocaine are, in the words of dissenting
Justice Stevens, "extremely high."33 The defendants had been indicted on the
basis of a federal and local investigation of a suspected distribution ring.31 On at
least seven occasions, informants had purchased more than 124 grams of crack
from the defendants. 32 In addition, the informants had noticed the presence of
firearms carried by one or more of the defendants.' As a result of the investiga-
326. Id.
327. See, e.g., Celeste A. Albonetti, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Effects of Uncertainty, 21 L. & Soc'Y
REv. 291 (1987); Developments in the Law - Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through
Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1221 (1979).
328. Note, Seth T. Goldsamt, Crucified by the FCC"? Howard Stern, the FCC, and Selective Prosecution.
28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 203, 228, 232 (1995) (referring to United States v. Pretty Prods., 780 F. Supp.
1488 (S.D. Ohio 1991)).
329. 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
330. Id. at 477 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens observed that
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and subsequent legislation established a regime of extremely high
penalties for the possession and distribution of so-called 'crack' cocaine. Those provisions treat one
gram of crack as the equivalent of 100 grams of powder cocaine. The distribution of 50 grams of
crack is thus punishable by the same mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years in prison that applies
to the distribution of 5,000 grams of powder cocaine. The [Federal] Sentencing Guidelines extend
this ratio to penalty levels above the mandatory minimums; for any given quantity of crack, the
guideline range is the same as if the offense had involved 100 times that amount in powder cocaine.
... These penalties result in sentences for crack offenders that average three to eight times longer
than sentences for comparable powder offenders.
Id. at 478.
33 1. Id. at 456.
332. Id. at 458.
333. Id.
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tion, federal agents searched a hotel room, arrested Armstrong and others, and
found additional quantities of crack, as well as a loaded gun. 3 ' The defendants,
through a motion for discovery or for dismissal, contended that they were the
victims of selective prosecution "because they are black."33
In support of their motion, the defendants submitted several documents,
including an affidavit by a "paralegal specialist" within the Office of the Federal
Public Defender. The affidavit stated that, in every one of the cases closed by the
office in 1991, the defendant was black.3 In addition, the defendants offered an
affidavit authored by the intake administrator at a drug treatment center that stat-
ed that the facility received an equal number of white and minority drug users. 37
A criminal defense attorney likewise submitted an affidavit that noted that non-
blacks were typically charged in state courts, where maximum potential penalties
were substantially less exacting. 38 The defendants also relied upon a newspaper
article that asserted that federal "crack criminals... are being punished far more
severely than if they had been caught with powder cocaine, and almost every sin-
gle one of them is black."
339
The district court responded to the motion by issuing a discovery order direct-
ed to the government. It required that the prosecutors provide a listing of all
cases in which the federal government had charged both cocaine and firearm
offenses, the race of the defendants in the cases, the level of law enforcement
involved in the cases, and "its criteria for deciding to prosecute those defendants
for federal cocaine offenses. 340 When the government refused to comply with
the order, the district court dismissed the indictments. 41 The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that defendants must "supply a colorable basis for
believing that others similarly situated have not been prosecuted" in order to
obtain discovery.342 It emphasized, however, that the defendants need not demon-
strate that the government has failed to prosecute defendants of other races who
otherwise could have been prosecuted. 343
The Supreme Court's majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
discussed whether Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the
discovery of government work product and other documents in a selective prose-
334. Id.
335. Id. at 459.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 460.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 459 (quoting Newton, Harsher Crack Sentences Criticized as Racial Inequality, Los ANGELES
TIMES, Nov. 23, 1992, at 1); 48 E3d at 1518. See also Christopher Slobogin, Having It Both Ways: Proof that
the US. Supreme Court is "Unfairly" Prosecution-Oriented, 48 FLA. L. REV. 743 (1996); Note, Challenging
Selective Enforcement of Traffic Conditions after the Disharmonic Convergence: Whren v. United States,
United States v. Armstrong, and the Evolution of Police Discretion, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1083 (1998).
340. Id.
341. 517 U.S. at 461.
342. 21 F3d 1431, 1437 (9th Cir. 1994).
343. The defendant did not challenge the constitutionality of the 100:1 ratio found in the United States
Sentencing Guidelines. The ratio treats a defendant who traffics in crack cocaine the same as an individual
who traffics in 100 times as much powder cocaine. Several courts have rejected facial challenges to the 100:1
ratio. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 1997 FED App. 0301P (6th Cir. Oct. 8, 1997); United States v.
Jackson, 84 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 445 (1996); United States v. Carter, 91 E3d 1196 (8th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Teague, 93 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1067 (1997); United States
v. Burgos, 94 E3d 849 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1151 (1997).
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cution context in which the defendant has filed a motion for discovery in
response to an indictment. 3" The Court concluded that "discovery would be
available if the defendant could make the appropriate threshold showing" of
selective prosecution. 4 Accordingly, the Court focused on whether the defen-
dants had presented sufficient evidence to support the "independent assertion
that the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons forbidden by the Consti-
tution."
346
By creating a rigorous "threshold showing" requirement for obtaining discov-
ery in selective prosecution cases,347 the majority opinion essentially requires-in
federal criminal cases in which selective prosecution is advanced as a defense-a
demonstration of a prima facie case, in the absence of discovery. The majority
sharply criticized the evidence offered by the defendant and refused to accept the
proposition that the Sentencing Guidelines, coupled with statistics showing that
blacks were predominant users of crack cocaine, demonstrated an unconstitution-
al disparity. 4 It characterized the study offered by the defendants as inadequate
in that it "failed to identify [that] individuals who were not black, could have
been prosecuted for the offenses for which respondents were charged, but were
not so prosecuted.' 349 The newspaper articles offered in support of defendant's
motion were deemed "not relevant," and the affidavits simply "recounted hearsay
and reported personal conclusions based on anecdotal evidence."3 ' Accordingly,
the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceed-
ings.
3 5 1
The Court's test for a finding of the required evidentiary threshold-a credible
showing of differential treatment of similarly situated persons 3 2-apparently
includes both "essential evidence of the defense," as well as discriminatory effect
and discriminatory intent.3 53 The dissent argued that the affidavits submitted on
behalf of the defendants detailed personal knowledge and were not based on
hearsay. Justice Stevens observed that the government never objected to the
introduction of the affidavits or the newspaper article and contended that the evi-
344. 517 U.S. at 461-63.
345. Id. at 463.
346. Id. (referring to Wade v. United States, 504 US. 181 (1992)). The Court justified its imposition of a
"rigorous standard for discovery" on the argument that
[i]f discovery is ordered, the Government must assemble from its own files documents that might
correlate or refute the defendant's claim. Discovery thus imposes many of the costs present when
the Government must respond to a prima facie case of selective prosecution. It will divert prosecu-
tors' resources and may disclose the prosecutors' resources and may disclose the Government's pros-
ecutorial strategy.
Id. at 468.
347. "By setting an unrealistically high threshold for discovery, the Court communicated a troubling indif-
ference to the appearance of injustice, missing an important opportunity to condemn racial bias and to strength-
en public faith in the neutrality of the criminal justice system." Developments in the Law: The Supreme Court
-Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L. REv. 135, 166 (1996); see also id. at 170; Marc Michael, United States v.
Armstrong: Selective Prosecution - A Futile Defense and its Arduous Standard of Discovery, 47 CATH. U. L.
REv. 675 (1998).
348. 517 U.S. at 469.
349. Id. at 470.
350. Id.
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dence before the lower court justified the issuance of an order compelling dis-
covery.3"4 The majority, however, insisted that the evidence failed to demonstrate
the "substantial threshold showing" that "similarly situated defendants of other
races could have been prosecuted, but were not . ". .""'
Armstrong will not directly affect selective prosecution claims based on state,
rather than federal, constitutional guarantees. For example, in 1991, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court ruled, in State v. Russell,"' that a state statute which
imposed a significantly higher maximum penalty for the possession of crack
cocaine violated the state constitution." 7 The court, applying the rational basis
test, accepted statistics that crack cocaine was used predominantly by blacks and,
on the strength of evidence of discriminatory effect alone, required the state to
demonstrate a legitimate purpose for the differential penalty. The court did not
require evidence that prosecutors' charging decisions were based on an imper-
missible criteria, such as race, or that blacks were arrested or indicted more fre-
quently than members of other races. Indeed, the court reasoned that the purpose
or intent of the statute that imposed maximum penalties for crack cocaine pos-
session was essentially irrelevant."
The court rejected the state's primary defense-that the penalties for crack
cocaine were intended to facilitate prosecution of "street level" drug dealers-as
being based on mere "anecdotal support."3 9 Accordingly, while the Armstrong
court held that statistical or "anecdotal" evidence was insufficient and that the
defendant not only had the burden of demonstrating a prima facie case, but also
had to demonstrate actual purposeful discrimination in the charging decision, the
Russell court allowed the defendant to transfer the burdens of proof and persua-
sion to the state merely on the basis of statistical evidence-indeed, essentially
on the uncontroverted proposition that blacks "constitute the largest percentage
of crack users while whites are the largest users of powder cocaine."3" Given the
fact that a number of courts have deemed state constitutions to provide greater
protections than the federal provisions, 1 defendants may increasingly seek to
rely upon state equal protection guarantees in state civil and criminal proceed-
ings.
Armstrong by no means forecloses selective prosecution claims in federal
enforcement proceedings. It does, however, demonstrate the importance of proof
by defendants that a pattern of nonenforcement that essentially benefits an iden-
tifiable group of known violators--"different treatment of similarly situated per-
sons" 3 2 -can be contrasted with the prosecution of a select few. Likewise, while
354. Id. at 480.
355. Id. at 469.
356. 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991).
357. Id. at 888.
358. Id. See, e.g., Deborah K. McKnight, Minnesota Rational Relation Test: The Lochner Monster in the
10,000 Lakes, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. RE. 779 (1984).
359. 477 N.W.2d at 887-88.
360. Id. at 886-87.
361. Id.
362. See generally Note, Upholding the Public Trust in State Constitutions, 46 DuKE L.J. 1169 (1997).
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Armstrong does not address whether selective prosecution claims are appropriate
in the civil context or, if so, whether the standard for review is identical, claim-
ants in federal civil proceedings likely will encounter obstacles to discovery in
instances in which a compelling case for a finding of discrimination does not
already exist.
IV THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE: ADDRESSING "DE FACTO FLOW CONTROL'
Flow control need not always result from a specific ordinance or an articulated
waste disposal facility designation or preference program. It may, instead, delib-
erately occur through less obvious means. Indeed, the preemption doctrine may
serve as an additional method for addressing instances of local "de facto" flow
control activities.
Since the Carbone decision, local governments, particularly those with signifi-
cant outstanding debt from large [waste-to-energy] facilities, have resorted to
other means of controlling solid waste flow. Efforts to lock in waste from
industrial and commercial sources by some municipalities have resulted in
broad regulation of solid waste facilities and operations within their jurisdiction
.... Prohibiting certain types of disposal options for particular waste streams is
used in some areas as de facto flow control. Licensing and taxing are some of
the prerogatives used by cities and counties. Local land use, zoning, and code
enforcement have been widely employed to restrict non-governmental competi-
tion. This approach has limited the private sector in the form of reduced compe-
tition and fewer new facilities, thereby forcing the waste toward the government
owned facilities as the "best" alternative.36 3
These kinds of "indirect" flow control, resulting from additional local regula-
tion of facilities and zoning ordinances, may either expressly or impliedly con-
flict with comprehensive state solid waste management statutes. The standards
utilized by state courts in evaluating claims that a local requirement is impliedly
preempted are typically identical to the criteria employed by courts in examining
preemption pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
Accordingly, a brief review of federal implied preemption doctrine is in order.3 64
In examining the doctrine, the United States Supreme Court has noted that "a
court's primary function is to determine whether, under the circumstances of [a]
particular case, [a non-federal] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. '35 Preemption by
363. Jerry Wood & Chris Kohl, The Emerging Marketplace for C&D Recycling, FLORIDA SPECIFIER, Dec.
1997, at 14.
364. For general discussions of the preemption doctrine, see, e.g., Archibald Cox & Marshall J. Seidman,
Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HARv. L. REv. 211 (1950); Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign
States: Preemption and the Second Twentieth Century Revolution on the Law of the American Workplace, 62
FoRDHAM L. REv. 469 (1993); Barbara L. Atwell, Products Liability and Preemption: A Judicial Framework, 39
BuFF. L. REv. 181 (1991).
365. Hines, Secretary of Labor and Indus. of Pa. v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1941). Regulations and
other non-statutory directives, including nonconsensual permit requirements, may also be subject to a determi-
nation of preemption. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993); Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
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federal law or regulation occurs when a state or local power interferes with the
corresponding federal power."'
Indeed, it has long been accepted that when a state activity interferes with a
similar federal power, the federal standard prevails."6 7 Likewise, state standards
preempt, in the absence of express home rule guarantees or "savings" provisions
in state laws,368 inconsistent local requirements. 69 A number of state courts have
invalidated local ordinances, 30 zoning requirements, and other conditions or
mandates on the basis of implied preemption. 71
A. Significant Decisions
The implied preemption doctrine goes beyond local actions that are clearly
contradictory to state laws or regulations.372  The courts have recognized that
standards may, due to their comprehensive nature, "occupy" the regulatory
field,373 thus preempting any consistent or inconsistent activities by subordinate
units of government. 74 The Supreme Court has emphasized the implied preemp-
tion doctrine in several decisions concerning non-federal environmental and
safety standards or laws. In International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, the Court held
that the nuisance law of the source state (New York) must be applied in a claim in
federal court (in Vermont) against the source. 75
366. See, e.g., with regard to "field" preemption, City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S.
624, 633 (1973) ("It is the pervasive nature of the scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise that leads us to
conclude that there is pre-emption.").
367. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); Gade Dir. Ill. E.P.A. v. National Solid Wastes
Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992); International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
368. See generally Neur. Shortlidge & S. Mark White, The Use of Zoning and Other Local Controls for
Siting Solid and Hazardous Waste Facilities, 8 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3 (1993).
369. See, e.g., Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996); Wisconsin Public
Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991).
370. See, e.g., Township of Howell v. Fred McDowell, Inc., 693 A.2d 490 (N.J. App. Div. 1997) (state recy-
cling and solid waste management laws preempted local zoning ordinance that required use variance for new
recycling facility); Soaring Vista Properties, Inc. v. County Commissioners for Queen Anne's County, No. CV
6024 (Md. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 1997) (ordinance barring certain solid waste facilities preempted by comprehensive
state laws and regulations); Days Cove Reclamation Co. v. State, No. 97118058/CC1738 (Md. Cir. Ct. July 8,
1997) (zoning ordinance that precluded private landfills preempted by state regulations that establish permitting
standards); Perdue Farms, Inc. v. Hadder, 675 A.2d 577 (Md. App. 1996) (state water quality regulation pre-
empts local special zoning condition).
371. See Bruce J. Parker & John H. Turner, Overcoming Obstacles to the Siting of Solid Waste Management
Facilities, 21 N. MEX. L.R. 91, 95-101 (1990) (collecting cases). The authors note that "[b]y repudiating local
ordinances that attempt to regulate facility siting in a manner inconsistent with state law, the courts - virtually
without exception - have affirmed the maxim that where the state has enacted a comprehensive regulatory
scheme, no local actions or ordinances shall be permitted to contravene it." Id. at 101.
372. There is, of course, no need for a court to examine implied preemption claims if the governing statute
either expressly reserves local regulatory authority or includes specific preemptory language.
373. See, e.g., Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 339 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (to allow state law
tort claims regarding wrongfil refusals to board airline passengers "would result in significant defacto regula-
tion of the airlines' boarding practices").
374. For a general discussion of "field" preemption, see CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732
(1993); Cranberry Hill Corp. v. Shaffer, 629 F Supp. 628 (N.D.N.Y. 1986). An excellent example of field pre-
emption is the decision in Morales v. Trans WorldAirlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992). There, the Court held that
the Airline Deregulation Act precluded state laws that, while not inconsistent with or contrary to the federal
statute, dealt with the same subject matter. See also American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995)
(field preemption doctrine applied to contract claims against airlines regarding frequent-flyer programs); Smith
v. Comair, Inc., No. 96-2451 (4th Cir. Jan. 15, 1998) (tort claims alleging that airline refused to allow passenger
to board flight due to lack of identification preempted by federal legislation); Stabile, Preemption of State Law
by Federal Law: A Task for Congress or the Courts?, 40 VILL. L. REv. 1, 38-46 (1995).
375. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
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A Vermont statute attempted to impose that state's nuisance law upon dis-
charges from other states that affected navigable waters shared by the states.37
Several Vermont residents sought an award of damages under a common law nui-
sance claim, arguing that Vermont law was applicable.377 The Court reasoned
that while state nuisance actions were not expressly precluded by the Clean
Water Act, the sheer pervasiveness of the regulatory scheme created by the legis-
lation displaced all state-created remedies, except those specifically preserved by
the Congress.
7 8
Although the Clean Water Act contains a savings clause for privately instituted
litigation, the Court concluded that Vermont's statute was preempted."' It
opined that "[i]f affected states were allowed to impose separate discharge stan-
dards on a single point source, the inevitable result would be a serious interfer-
ence with the achievement of the full purposes of objectives of Congress."38
Moreover, the application of the Vermont legislation would "undermine the
important goal of efficiency and predictability in the permit system." '381 The
Court proclaimed that "Congress intended to dominate the field of (water) pollu-
tion regulation. ' 382 In the absence of a single federal standard, a source could be
subject to several state laws, each imposing a different standard of tort liability.
3 3
The goal of Congress in ensuring that sources could predict the criteria to which
they would be responsible would have been severely undermined by the prolifer-
ation of disparate state nuisance standards." 4
Likewise, in Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass 'n, the Court
applied both express and implied preemption analysis to invalidate Illinois
statutes that imposed licensing and training requirements upon employers and
employees at hazardous waste remediation sites.3 18 The statutes required training
of employees that greatly exceeded, both in time and cost, the requirements set
forth in federal regulations. 3 6 The lower courts emphasized the fact that Section
18(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) "prevent[s]





381. Id. at 496.
382. Id. at 492.
383. Id.
384. For similar reasoning in non-environmental arenas, see, e.g., Cippolone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504 (1992) (Congress impliedly preempted certain common law tort claims by the Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969); Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 E Supp. 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (federal
copyright legislation, by its comprehensive nature, displaced common law tort claims for infringement). See
generally Joel P Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government Responsibility, 26
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 975 (1994) (discussing importance of predictability in regulatory standards); Cass R.
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 405 (1989) (important role of courts
in promoting the goal of predictability). The importance of an understandable, efficient regulatory system has
been stressed by a number of commenters who seek increased federal superintendence of a number of regulato-
ry issues. See, e.g., David F. Welsh, Environmental Marketing and Federal Preemption of State Law:
Eliminating the "Gray" Behind the "Green "', 81 CAL. L. REv. 991 (1993). But see Schoenbrod, Why States, Not
EPA, Should Set Pollution Standards, REG. (1996, No. 4), at 18 (arguing for substantially reduced EPA regulato-
ry presence, and seemingly recommending that standards be developed at the local, rather than the state, level).
385. 505 U.S. 88 (1992).
386. Id. at 91.
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any State agency or court from asserting jurisdiction over State law over any
occupational safety or health issue with respect to which a Federal standard has
been issued under Section 6 of the Act. 387
OSHA had previously stressed that the preemption provisions of the Act
"apply to all state or local laws which relate to an issue covered by a federal stan-
dard, without regard to whether the state law appears to be 'at least as effective
as' the federal standard." '388 The Occupational Safety and Health Commission
had consistently ruled that "states without approved state plans are preempted by
the Federal Act as to all issues covered by Federal OSHA standards." '389
The lower courts found that, in light of the fact that the Illinois statutes regulat-
ed workplace occupational health, they were displaced by federal standards in the
absence of a state plan developed pursuant to Section 18(b) of the Act and
approved by OSHA.390 Illinois was noticeably absent from the list of states that
had submitted comprehensive workplace safety and health plans and received
federal approval of those plans. Indeed, the state, apparently succumbing to
political pressure, actually withdrew its plan after securing OSHA approval.
Accordingly, the courts reasoned, the result of Illinois' reluctance to assume the
role that Congress contemplated for states was that the vast majority of the state's
workers had no mandated protection from workplace hazards not specifically
addressed by federal standards or the Act's general duty clause. 91
The lower courts observed that the bizarre result of the Illinois statutes was
that only those groups of employees that possessed the political clout and the
will to push specific workplace requirements through the legislature would
receive the benefits that Congress contemplated for all employees-a compre-
hensive state program that provides coverage for all workers. The courts, accord-
ingly, rejected the state's efforts to characterize the statutes as general environ-
mental or public health legislation.
The Supreme Court concluded that, even if the legislation could be viewed as a
licensing scheme or as an environmental measure, it was impliedly preempted by
the pervasive federal regulation of workplace safety and health established by
OSHA and its implementing regulations.3 9 2 According to OSHA, the purpose of
the federal regulation that concerns the training of workers engaged in hazardous
remediation activity is to "regulate employee safety and health in hazardous
waste operations and during emergency response to hazardous substance opera-
tions and during emergency response to hazardous substance incidents. 393 If the
provisions of the Illinois statutes had been enforced, affected employees would,
at best, have received duplicative training, at considerable cost to both employers
and employees.
387. 29 C.F.R. § 1901.2.
388. 52 Fed. Reg. 31852, 31860 (1987).
389. Robinson Pipe Cleaning Co. v. Department of Labor and Indus., 2 O.S.H.C. 1114 (D.N.J. 1974).
390. 505 U.S. 88 (1992).
391. Id.
392. Id. at 103-04, 107.
393. 52 Fed. Reg. 29620 (1987).
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Moreover, the application of both the federal and state training requirements
would have created conflict and confusion. Even assuming that the purpose of
the legislation was to create a licensing program or to protect the environment,
implementation of the measures would have contravened the intended scope of
state regulation under the Act and would have seriously impeded the purposes of
the Act.
The Court recognized that Congress unquestionably granted OSHA the power
to assure safe working environments; equally apparent was that such was
OSHA's intent in promulgating workplace requirements regarding hazardous
waste operations and emergency responses. Congress intended to avoid the con-
fusion that multiple laws, state and federal, cause employers and employees. In
addition, given that the education that would have been imparted to workers pur-
suant to the Illinois mandate would be essentially the same as that provided pur-
suant to the OSHA regulation, the state laws would, at best, have provided a
dubious benefit.
At the same time, the extra burden imposed on employers who operate in
Illinois, who would have been forced to comply with both sets of requirements,
would have been needless and excessive given that Illinois could have acquired
the same "benefit," employee health and safety, through compliance with the
OSHA standard. Furthermore, while the OSHA standard was expressly intended
to protect employees from hazards in the workplace, it nonetheless accomplished,
in a wider sense, precisely what Illinois sought to achieve: improving worker
safety and health, which translates into intangible benefits to society. Illinois
was unable to demonstrate that a separate state scheme for worker safety and
health and hazardous waste remediation sites would result in greater protection
for workers, the environment surrounding the sites, or the general public than
would simply legislating that the requirements set forth in the OSHA standard be
satisfied by employers operating in Illinois.
B. New Hampshire Decision
The recent decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Pelham v.
Browning-Ferris Industries of New Hampshire39 demonstrates the breadth of the
preemption doctrine. The State and Browning-Ferris ("BFI") entered into a con-
sent agreement for the "reclosure" of a landfill located in Pelham, New
Hampshire. The town filed a lawsuit, asking that the court require the state and
BFI to comply with local zoning, site plan, and health regulations. In its petition,
394. 43 ERC 1570 (Sept. 30, 1996).
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[t]he town argued that the proposed reclosure (of the landfill) constitutes a
reopening of the landfill, requiring a special exception from the zoning board of
adjustment to permit operation in a rural district and a variance to permit opera-
tion in an aquifer conservation district. The town further argued that the staging
area, detention ponds, and methane recovery building constitute an expansion of
a nonconforming use, also requiring a special exception and variance. In addi-
tion, the town contended that all aspects of the construction plan require site
plan approval from the planning board. Finally, the town maintained that its
health code regulations require approval for the operation of the landfill. 9
The court rejected the town's arguments, noting, in part, that
[p]ursuant to its rulemaking authority, (the state environmental agency) has pro-
mulgated comprehensive and detailed technical standards governing landfill
closures. Given DWM's express authority to regulate landfill closures and the
absence of any (specific) provision for local involvement, we conclude that (the
state statute) places exclusive control of landfill closures in the State and its
agencies. 39
6
Likewise, the court found that the utilization in the state legislation of the term
"minimum standards" did not justify the imposition of local requirements.
"Rather, we believe these words were intended simply to encourage individuals
responsible for closing solid waste facilities to surpass State requirements, and
not to provide concurrent jurisdiction to localities." '397 Indeed, "[w]e believe that
local control over landfill closures would impede DWM's 'exercise of its exper-
tise in a field where expertise is of critical importance."'398 The court's preemp-
tion analysis touched on all major components of implied preemption theory.
Whether phrased in "field" preemption terminology or by a determination that
the measure in question "stand[s] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and exe-
cution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," '399 the effect of many
local solid waste management requirements is to duplicate state or federal provi-
sions and contradict the reason why state standards were developed: to provide
395. Id. at 1571-72.
396. Id. at 1574 (citation omitted). The court went on to conclude that
[o]ur finding of preemption extends to all local action that has the intent or effect of frustrating the
State's authority to regulate landfill closures. Looking at the specific regulations sought to be
applied by the town in this case, we conclude that the requirement of obtaining exceptions and vari-
ances under the town's zoning ordinances and approval under the town health code would amount to
an impermissible "veto power," over the State's exercise of its authority.
Id.
397. Id.
398. Id. (citing Town of Salisbury v. New England Power Co., 437 A.2d 281, 282 (N.H. 1981)).
399. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 142-43 (1963); Ray, Governor of Wash. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978).
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uniform criteria for the management and the disposal or incineration of solid
waste through means that are protective of human health and the environment.'00
V CONCLUSION
This review of several constitutional provisions demonstrates the fact that flow
control requirements and programs have little chance of surviving judicial
review. Perhaps more importantly, the decisions issued by courts pursuant to the
Commerce, Equal Protection, Contract, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses,
as well as those pertaining to the preemption doctrine, amply demonstrate the
wisdom of the drafters of the Constitution and the timeless importance of a
Nation that constitutes a single economic market.
400. For other recent examples of the reach of preemption analysis, see United States v. City & County of
Denver, 100 F.3d 1509 (10th Cir. 1996) (local zoning requirements pertaining to Superfund site preempted by
EPA remediation order issued pursuant to CERCLA); Larkin v. Michigan Dept. of Soc. Servs., 89 E3d 285 (6th
Cir. 1996) (amendments to the Federal Fair Housing Act preempted Michigan legislation that required setback
distances and public notification for residential facilities housing handicapped adults); CSX Trans., Inc. v. City
of Plymouth, Mich., 86 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 1996) (Federal Railway Safety Act preempted local ordinance that
limited train traffic by restricting blockages of streets to less than five minute durations); Perdue Farms, Inc. v.
Hadder, 675 A.2d 577 (Md. Spec. App. 1996) (poultry processing site not required to comply with more strin-
gent local requirement pertaining to nitrogen content of wastewater discharges due to comprehensive nature of
state regulation); Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, 913 P.2d 1141 (Idaho 1996); Lane v. Zoning
Board of Adjustment, 669 So. 2d 958 (Ala. App. 1995) (zoning requirement applied to proposed county jail
facility preempted by federal legislation); Gora v. City of Ferndale, 533 N.W.2d 840 (Mich. App. 1995) (while a
state program of regulation of massage parlors had not been implemented, Michigan law impliedly preempted
local ordinance--court stated that no regulation is preferable to local standards that undercut state goals); State
College Borough Auth. v. Board of Superv. Halfmoon Township, Pa., 659 A.2d 640 (Pa. Commw. 1995) (com-
prehensive scope of river basin compact impliedly preempted local water use criteria).

